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I. INTRODUCTION
Two principal types of business organization, the corporation and the
limited partnership, presently are fulfilling the need for a form of associa-
tion that permits an investor to contribute capital and receive a share of
the profits while remaining free from both management responsibility and
personal liability in excess of the amount invested. Limited partnerships
first received statutory recognition in this country in New York in 1822,1
but because of the strict requirements contained in early statutes and the
courts' strict construction of them,2 limited partnerships did not come of
age until promulgation in 1916 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(1916 Act). Since that time the 1916 Act has received almost universal ac-
ceptance.3
© Copyright 1981 Edwin W. Hecker, Jr.
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J.D., 1969, Wayne State University; LL.M., 1970, Harvard University.
t The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable research assistance
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1. 1822 N.Y. Laws ch. 244.
2. Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715,
720-23 (1917).
3. See 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 111-12 (Supp. 1981).
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The fact that limited partnerships, unlike corporations, generally are
not treated as separate legal entities for federal income tax purposes, 4
coupled with the advent of sophisticated tax shelter planning, has caused a
tremendous growth in the number, size, and economic importance of
limited partnerships over the past two decades. Previously, most limited
partnerships were enterprises with relatively few limited partners who
often were associated closely with the general partner or partners either
personally, professionally, or geographically. Because of the tax benefits
and limited liability in the limited partnership form, this pattern has
changed. During the early 1970s, much of the risk capital invested in
speculative fields, such as real estate, oil and gas, timber, equipment leas-
ing, motion pictures, and cattle, was channeled through limited partner-
ships, with interests marketed publicly to thousands of passive investors
throughout the country.5 While the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the
Revenue Act of 1978 limited some of the special tax benefits previously
available in these fields of investment, one of the largest, real estate syn-
dications, emerged relatively unscathed. 6
The primary impetus leading to promulgation of the 1916 Act was the
extremely restrictive interpretation given to prior limited partnership
statutes by the courts.7 Cases espousing narrow interpretations almost in-
variably arose in the context of a creditor seeking to impose personal lia-
bility on one or more limited partners based on some technical defect in
the formation or operation of the partnership.8 It is not surprising,
therefore, that the primary focus of the drafters of the 1916 Act was on
those provisions affecting the relationship of the firm and its members to
third-party creditors. Because of this preoccupation with insulating
limited partners from unlimited personal liability, provisions concerning
the financial affairs of the partnership appear to have been less
4. I.R.C. §§ 701-702. If a limited partnership has too many corporate
characteristics, however, it may be treated as a corporation for tax purposes. For
discussions of the problem of tax classification of limited partnerships, see 1 Z.
CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING § 9.03 (1980); Note,
Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships, 90 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1977); Note,
Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards the Tax Shelters,
52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 408 (1977).
5. See Glasser, Gimme Shelter: Reform of Real Estate Tax Shelters, 7 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 267, 267-68 (1974); Roulac, Resolution of Limited Partnership
Disputes: Practical and Procedural Problems, 10 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
276, 279-80 (1975).
6. See I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D); Wiesner, Tax Shelters-A Survey of the Im-
pact of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 33 TAX L. REV. 5, 49-69 (1977) (predating
the Revenue Act of 1978).
7. See UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1, Comment (1916 version)
[hereinafter cited as 1916 ACT].
8. See, e.g., Haggerty v. Foster, 103 Mass. 17 (1869).
[Vol. 46578
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thoughtfully and less carefully drafted. In addition, as previously noted,
the 1916 Act was drafted during a period in which limited partnerships
were small, collegial concerns, more closely resembling general partner-
ships than corporations in all respects except the liability of their
members. Many modem, publicly owned limited partnerships, however,
in respects other than taxation, more closely resemble corporations than
general partnerships. The combination of these two factors has resulted in
a statute widely in force that, with respect to financial matters, leaves
significant questions either unanswered or answered in a manner that is ill-
suited to modem limited partnerships.
Perhaps impelled by this state of affairs, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1976 promulgated a revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976 Act). Its purpose is "to modernize
the prior uniform law while retaining the special character of limited part-
nerships as compared with corporations."' According to its drafters, the
1976 Act "clarifies many ambiguities and fills interstices in the prior
uniform law by adding more detailed language and mechanics. In addi-
tion, some important substantive changes and additions have been
made."10
The purpose of this Article is to examine those sections of the 1976 Act
that principally affect the financial affairs of limited partnerships. This
examination will consist primarily of a comparison of the 1976 Act with
the corresponding provisions of the 1916 Act, but it will also refer to
analogous principles of corporate law where relevant. Because of the con-
text in which the 1976 Act was promulgated, and because of the above
stated goals of the drafters, the discussion will consider both the degree to
which the 1976 Act clarifies ambiguities and fills interstices in the 1916 Act
and the degree to which it makes desirable substantive changes in limited
partnership law.
II. CONTRIBUTIONS TO CAPITAL
A. Form of Contribution
Section 501 of the 1976 Act specifies that the capital contribution of a
partner, either general or limited, "may be in cash, property, or services
rendered, or a promissory note or other obligation to contribute cash or
property or to perform services."" This section is analogous to corporate
law provisions governing the quality of consideration necessary for the is-
suance of stock and which are intended to protect creditors of the enter-
9. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT Commissioners' Prefatory Note
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prise by providing a fund on which they may rely in extending credit.2
The following discussion first will focus on contributions of cash, property,
or services rendered, then will consider contributions consisting of an
obligation to furnish such items in the future, and finally, will examine
problems concerning valuation.
Section 4 of the 1916 Act provides that the contributions of limited
partners "may be cash or other property, but not services."' 3 Since there is
no provision governing contributions of general partners, the clear im-
plication is that their contributions may consist of services as well as cash or
property.' 4 The reason for this dichotomy regarding services is unclear. It
might be rationalized in terms of creditor protection, and there is some
language in the cases to support this view.'5 In other words, seryices
rendered may be the contribution of a general partner without prejudic-
ing creditors because he or she remains personally liable for partnership
obligations. A limited partner, however, because he or she will have
limited liability, must contribute something more tangible to the capital
fund. Unfortunately, this theory does not withstand analysis. Services are
as capable of adding realizable value to an enterprise as cash or property.
Moreover, services rendered have long been recognized by corporate law as
valid consideration for the issuance of stock, notwithstanding the limited
liability of shareholders.' 6
Actually, the reason for the distinction between general and limited
partners with respect to services probably is purely historical. The
predecessors of the modem limited partnership developed as a means to
permit the investment of capital by the clergy and by noble classes who
could not, or did not deign to, engage directly in commerce. 7 As a result,
those who drafted the 1916 Act appear to have assumed that cash or other
property was the only proper form of investment by limited partners.' 8
The cases decided under the 1916 Act, however, make it clear that a
limited partner may perform services for the limited partnership as long
12. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 409(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1981); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (Cum. Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.18
(Smith-Hurd 1954); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 504 (McKinney 1963).
13. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 4.
14. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 101, Comment. See Plasteel Prods. Corp. v.
Eisenberg, 170 F. Supp. 100 (D. Mass.), affd on other grounds sub nom. Plasteel
Prods. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959).
15. See Henningsenv. Barnard, 117 Cal. App. 2d 352, 255 P.2d 837 (1953);
Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954).
16. 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 5186 (rev. perm. ed. 1971). See, e.g., statutes cited note 12 supra.
17. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 716-17.
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as such services do not constitute his or her capital contribution. 19 Barring
any sound policy basis for the continued ban on contributions of services
rendered by limited partners, the change introduced by section 501 is
commendable. It adds flexibility to the law and removes an artificial con-
sideration from the decision whether to incorporate or operate as a limited
partnership.
Section 501's reference to contributions of cash or property both con-
tinues the law in effect under section 4 of the 1916 Act and reflects the
prevailing view in the corporate field. 20 These terms are relatively straight-
forward, offering little potential for serious problems. 21
On the other hand, permission to make a capital contribution in the
form of a promissory note or other obligation to contribute cash, property,
or services in the future introduces a radical change. It has been stated that
section 17 of the 1916 Act, which imposes liability on a limited partner for
"any unpaid contribution which he agreed in the certificate to make in the
future," 22 implicitly authorizes contributions by means of promissory notes
or other obligations to contribute cash or property in the future. 23 This
view misconstrues the 1916 Act. Section 4, as already noted, provides that
contributions of a limited partner "may be cash or other property." 24 Sec-
tion 2 requires that the certificate of limited partnership contain a state-
ment of the "amount of cash and a description of and the agreed value of
the other property contributed by each limited partner," and the "addi-
tional contributions, if any, agreed to be made by each limited partner."26
19. Compare Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954) with
Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Eisenberg, 170 F. Supp. 100 (D. Mass.), affd on other
grounds sub nom. Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959).
Of course, there is the danger that such services may constitute participation in
control with a resultant loss of limited liability. See 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 7.
This danger is removed by § 303(b)(1) of the 1976 Act, which provides that a
limited partner may be a contractor for, or an agent or employee of, the limited
partnership or of a general partner without being deemed to be participating in
control of the business.
20. See 11 W. FLETCHER, supra note 16, § 5186. See, e.g., statutes cited
note 12 supra.
21. See Wilson v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 613, 622-23 (N.D. Cal. 1965)
(contribution of fractional interest in former partnership sufficient); Henningsen
v. Barnard, 117 Cal. App. 2d 352, 360-61, 255 P.2d 837, 842 (1953) (contribu-
tion by check sufficient; fact that limited partner contributing on behalf of third
party as well as himself irrelevant).
22. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 17(1)(b).
23. Kessler, The New Uniform Limited Partnership Act: A Critique, 48
FORDHAM L. REv. 159, 168 (1979).
24. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 4. In the corporate context an unsecured
promissory note, being a mere promise to pay, generally is not held to be proper-
ty. N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 119, at 468 (2d ed. 1971).
25. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 2(1)(a) VI-VII (emphasis added).
1981] 581
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Section 17 then imposes liability on a limited partner for the difference
between his or her actual contribution and the amount stated in the cer-
tificate as having been contributed, and for any unpaid contribution that
he or she agreed in the certificate to make in the future.26 Read in this con-
text, the reference to unpaid contributions in section 17 seems clearly to
relate only to the additional contributions, if any, of a limited partner
above and beyond the required initial contribution of-cash or property.
Nor does section 501's validation of obligations to contribute cash,
property, or services find support by analogy in the corporate sphere.
Some statutes expressly state that notes or other obligations to pay for stock
in the future are not sufficient to support the present issuance of shares as
fully paid and nonassessable. 27 In other jurisdictions, in which the statute
speaks only in terms of "property," it generally is held that such an obliga-
tion does not constitute property, at least if it is not secured by collateral
other than the shares themselves. 28 The reason, again, is creditor protec-
tion- the notion that corporate capital ought to represent something more
substantial and realizable than the mere promises of shareholders to pay
for their stock at some future date. 29 Similarly, a promise of future services
generally is not valid consideration for the present issuance of stock, either
because the controlling statute expressly so provides"0 or because "services
rendered" as used in the statute correctly is interpreted as not extending to
future services. s Future services traditionally have been viewed as the type
of consideration most prejudicial to creditors because they are valuable
only if the enterprise remains a going concern. To the extent they remain
unperformed, they are totally valueless on liquidation. Moreover, unlike
goodwill or other intangible items that may prove worthless if the business
fails, future services have no salable, commercial value at any time. 2
26. Id. § 17(1)(a)-(b).
27. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 409(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1981) (unless
secured or stock issued pursuant to employee stock purchase plan); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, § 157.18 (Smith-Hurd 1954) (never constitutes payment); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 504(b) (McKinney 1963) (never constitutes payment).
28. Sohlandv. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431,141 A. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1927); N. LAT-
TIN, supra note 24, § 119. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (Cum. Supp. 1980), by
reason of a 1974 amendment, recognizes promissory notes, but only for the excess
of the purchase price over the amount that will be allocated to capital (generally
par value).
29. Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 451-52, 141 A. 277, 286 (Sup. Ct.
1927).
30. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 409(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp 1981); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.18 (Smith-Hurd 1954); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 504(b)
(McKinney 1963).
31. See, e.g., Maclary v. Pleasant Hills, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 39, 109 A.2d 830
(1954); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (Cum. Supp. 1980); 11 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 16, § 5187.
32. See Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the
Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1098, 1105-06 (1962).
[Vol. 46'582
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Whether section 501's break with the 1916 Act and corporate law is
desirable depends on the extent to which creditors actually rely on the
partners' capital contributions and the extent to which actual protection is
achieved by means of restrictions on the quality of those contributions.
While most creditors might wish that their debtors have substantial
amounts of tangible, unencumbered assets, this factor probably is not
paramount in the decision to extend credit. Assets assume primary impor-
tance only if the business fails and is liquidated, an event which the
creditor usually does not expect to occur. In the normal case, the obliga-
tions of a business will be paid from its earnings. If this is true, the pros-
pective creditor is more interested in the present and future earnings of an
enterprise than its assets. 3
Even if creditors are interested secondarily in a firm's assets, provisions
that prohibit the present acquistion of an equity interest in exchange for
an obligation to perform services or to contribute cash or property in the
future hardly seem to be an appropriate method of protecting this interest.
Such prohibitions, in fact, may be counterproductive. For example,
failure to recognize the present economic significance of the future services
of a highly talented individual may well prevent his or her association with
the firm, to its and its creditors' detriment. In addition, the capital con-
tributions of the partners will equal the firm's net assets only at the time of
organization. After the partnership has engaged in business for some
months or years, it will have acquired other assets, incurred liabilities, and
either will have earned or lost money. At this point, the initial contribu-
tions of the partners necessarily must be largely irrelevant to prospective
creditors. For this reason, such creditors will rely principally on current
financial data supplied either by the firm itself or by a commercial credit
investigation service, rather than on the historical capital contributions of
the partners as revealed by the certificate of limited partnership.3 4 Finally,
in order for restrictions on the quality of capital contributions to protect
creditors even remotely, they would have to be accompanied by quan-
titative provisions imposing substantial minimum capital requirements.
This the partnership law has never done.3 5 Thus, by adding flexibility
33. B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 13-14 (1977);
Herwitz, supra note 32, at 1109.
34. B. MANNING, supra note 33, at 22-23, 91-95; Herwitz, supra note 32, at
1109.
35. In the corporate field, minimum capital requirements have been
nominal. Today, most states have eliminated even the nominal $500 or $1,000 re-
quirement, with the result that a shareholder need pay only the par or stated
value of his or her stock, and there is no limit on how low this figure may be set.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.19
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 506 (McKinney
1963). California, recognizing the ineffectiveness of the concepts of par value and
legal capital, has eliminated them from its corporate code. See CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 202(d)-(e), 205 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1981). The apparent result is that
1981] 583
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without significantly sacrificing the interests of creditors, section 501's pro-
visions are commendable. 6
In liberalizing the law with respect to obligations to perform services or
to contribute cash or other property, however, section 501 has created two
other interrelated problems. The first is whether the obligation or the
underlying subject matter of the obligation should be considered as the
partner's contribution. Both the theory and the language of section 501
strongly suggest the former.3 7 This conclusion also is supported directly by
section 101(2), which defines "contribution" as "any cash, property, ser-
vices rendered, or a promissory note or other binding obligation to con-
tribute cash or property or to perform services."3 8 The necessary result of
these two sections appears to be that the obligation, itself, is a form of
property that may constitute a partner's capital contribution. 9
The further problem of valuation of such a contribution remains. This
issue is critical because it affects both the financial relations of the part-
ners, inter se, and the liability of a partner to the limited partnership and
ultimately to its creditors. 40 Because a promise to contribute cash or prop-
erty or to perform services in the future is worth less to the partnership than
such items presently in hand, one might expect that the obligation to be
performed in the future would be discounted to its present value.4 1 This
the entire consideration received for the issuance of shares should be allocated to
the capital account. See Ackerman & Sterrett, California's New Approach to
Dividends and Reacquisitions of Shares, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1052, 1052 n.4
(1976); Dreyfuss, Distributions to Shareholders Under the New California
General Corporation Law, 9 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 839, 846 (1976).
36. In addition, the 1976 Act attempts to protect creditors from a partner
who defaults on his or her obligation by specifically imposing liability for nonper-
formance. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 502. See text accompanying notes 71-79 in-
fra.
37. The 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 501 states, "The contribution of a part-
ner may be... a promissory note or other obligation to contribute cash or proper-
ty or to perform services."
38. Id. § 101(2) (emphasis added). The Comment to § 101 states, "Con-
tribution: this definition makes it clear that a present contribution of services and
a promise to make a future payment of cash, contribution of property or perform-
ance of services are permissible forms for a contribution." Potential interpretive
problems raised by § 503 and § 504, which govern the allocation of profits, losses,
and distributions in the absence of agreement, and which speak in terms of con-
tributions "to the extent they have been received by the partnership and have not
been returned," are considered in the text accompanying notes 124-26 infra.
39. See Gregory, The Financial Provisions of the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act: Articles 5 and 6, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 479, 481 (1978).
40. See, e.g., 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 101(10), 502(a), 503-504, 604-605,
607-608.
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approach apparently is not the one taken by the 1976 Act. According to
section 201, the certificate of limited partnership must set forth "the
amount of cash and a description and statement of the agreed value of the
other property or services contributed by each partner and which each
partner has agreed to contribute in the future. '42 While not a model of
clarity, the reference to the "amount" of cash appears to require that pres-
ent and future cash payments be reported identically. Consistency would
require a similar approach in valuing property and services. Thus, section
201 seems to contemplate that obligations to contribute cash or property
or to perform services in the future are to be valued as if the underlying
subject matter of the obligation had been contributed presently.
Section 502(a), 43 which is designed to protect both the partners and
partnership creditors, reinforces this conclusion. It states that
a partner is obligated ... to perform any promise to contribute
cash or property or to perform services .... If a partner does not
make the required contribution of property or services, he is obli-
gated.., to contribute cash equal to that portion of the value (as
stated in the certificate of limited partnership) of the stated con-
tribution that has not been made. 44
This provision, of course, will become operative only if a partner does not
perform his or her obligation when performance is due. At that point, the
present value of the obligation will equal its face amount. Consequently,
the cross-reference to value as stated in the certificate of limited partner-
ship must mean the face amount of the obligation because that is the only
sensible measure of a defaulting partner's liability. 45
Regarding valuation in general, section 201 requires that contribu-
tions other than cash be set forth in the certificate of limited partnership at
their "agreed value, ' 4 6 a carryover of the terminology of the 1916 Act. 47
The definition of this term again is important with respect to both poten-
tial liability to partnership creditors and the relations of the partners, inter
se. The corporate experience suggests at least two possible definitions.
First, section 201 may contemplate a statement of the actual, objective, or
so-called "true" value of the property or services. Second, it simply may re-
quire a good faith, though possibly erroneous, valuation. 48
With regard to partnership creditors, the primary significance of the
valuation issue derives from section 207, which creates a cause of action in
42. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 201(a)(5).
43. See id. § 502(a).
44. Id.
45. See id. § 101(2), Comment.
46. Id. § 201(a)(5).
47. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 2(l)(a)VI.
48. For a summary of the corporate law on this issue, see N. LATTIN, supra
note 24, § 122(b).
1981]
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favor of one who suffers loss by reliance on a false statement in the certifi-
cate of limited partnership. 49 In a case arising in this context under the
1916 Act, "agreed value" was interpreted to mean actual value." This
holding, however, is diluted by findings of fact indicating a knowing and
fairly gross overvaluation of the contributed property. Such findings were
necessary because section 6 of the 1916 Act imposes liability only for know-
ingly false statements in the certificate of limited partnership.5" This stan-
dard of culpability generally is continued in section 207 of the 1976 Act,52
with the result that even if "agreed value" is interpreted to mean actual
value, the practical effect with respect to creditors is much the same as the
good faith test prevalent in corporate law. 53
The question of valuation is important to the partners because the
agreed value of each partner's contribution will constitute his or her initial
capital account. Absent an agreement to the contrary, partnership profits
and losses will be allocated, and distributions will be made, on the basis of
the value of the partners' contributions as stated in the certificate." An in-
correct valuation will distort these ratios inequitably. In addition, gains or
losses occasioned by the disposition of partnership property are allocated
among the partners. If contributed property is undervalued or overvalued
at the time of contribution, a subsequent disposition may result in alloca-
tion of an accounting gain or loss among all the partners when it should be
realized or borne solely by the contributor.55
B. Liability for Contribution
It is unfortunate, but a partner may not have made the contribution to
capital that the certificate of limited partnership attributes to him or her
or may not fulfill an agreement to make contributions in the future. The
following discussion will examine a number of problems relative to the
defaulting partner's liability.
49. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 207.
50. Walraven v. Ramsay, 335 Mich. 331, 55 N.W.2d 853 (1952).
51. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 6.
52. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 207. Actually, § 207 predicates the liability of
limited partners on knowing conduct and of general partners on knowing or
negligent conduct. The class of potential plaintiffs, however, is restricted to those
who suffer loss by reliance on the false statement. Such losses usually will occur
only if the partnership becomes insolvent, and, in view of general partners'
unlimited personal liability, lowering the standard of culpability to encompass
negligence should have little practical effect.
53. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 409(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1981); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (Cum. Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.18
(Smith-Hurd 1954); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 504(a) (McKinney 1963).
54. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 503-504.
55. K. SOLOMON, supra note 41, at 151. See S. DAVIDSON, HANDBOOK OF
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As noted previously, the 1916 Act contemplates not only present con-
tributions of cash or property by limited partners, but also the possibility of
obligations to make additional contributions in the future.5 6 Thus,
defaults may arise in two principal ways. First, a limited partner may fail
to contribute part or all of the cash or property that the certificate of
limited partnership describes as his or her present contribution.57 Section
17 of the 1916 Act addresses this problem by providing that the limited
partner is liable to the partnership "[f]or the difference between his contri-
bution as actually made and that stated in the certificate as having been
made." 15 8 Moreover, regarding contributions of property, section 17 states
that a limited partner holds "as trustee" for the partnership "[s]pecific
property stated in the certificate as contributed by him, but which was not
contributed."59 By incorporating this trust law terminology, section 17
provides a basis on which the partnership apparently could recover the ac-
tual property rather than its cash equivalent.
The second type of default that may occur under the 1916 Act is the
refusal or inability of a limited partner to make an additional, agreed,
future contribution. In this situation section 17 clearly imposes liability to
the partnership "[flor any unpaid contribution which he agreed in the cer-
tificate to make in the future at the time and on the conditions stated in the
certificate." 60 The 1916 Act, therefore, contains direct and relatively
unambiguous sanctions for the two types of default regarding contribu-
tions that may occur within its framework.
Under the 1976 Act the situation is more complex. Partners' contribu-
tions fall into three categories: (1) present contributions of cash, property,
or services rendered; (2) present contributions of obligations to contribute
cash or property or to perform services in the future; and (3) obligations to
make additional contributions in the future that do not purport to be pres-
ent contributions. 61 Correspondingly, a partner may default in at least the
following four ways: (1) by failing to contribute part or all of the cash,
property, or services rendered described in the certificate as having been
contributed; (2) by failing to contribute the obligation described in the
certificate as having been contributed; (3) by presently contributing the
56. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 2(1)(a)VI-VII.
57. See Bell Sound Studios, Inc. v. Enneagram Prods. Co., 36 Misc. 2d 879,
234 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1962).
58. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 17(1)(a).
59. Id. § 17(2)(a).
60. Id. § 17(1)(b).
61. See 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 101(2), 201(a)(5)-(6), 501. Because a
binding obligation to contribute cash or property or to perform services may be a
present contribution, the reference to "additional" contributions in § 201(a)(6)
indicates the drafters envisioned the third category described in the text.
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obligation, but failing to perform when performance is due; and (4) by fail-
ing to make an additional, agreed, future contribution. 62
It seems the drafters did not recognize the monster they had created.
Section 502(a), the only section in the 1976 Act purporting to deal with the
liability to the partnership of a partner who defaults with respect to his or
her contribution, provides:
Except as provided in the certificate of limited partnership, a part-
ner is obligated to the limited partnership to perform any promise
to contribute cash or property or to perform services, even if he is
unable to perform because of death, disability or any other reason.
If a partner does not make the required contribution of property
or services, he is obligated at the option of the limited partnership
to contribute cash equal to that portion of the value (as stated in
the certificate of limited partnership) of the stated contribution
that has not been made. 6
Of the four default situations, only the third clearly falls within section
502(a). The fourth situation, factually the most similar to the third, also
might be covered. The reference in the first sentence of section 502(a) to
failure "to perform any promise" apparently is not limited solely to obliga-
tions that purport to be present contributions. 64 The second sentence is
more troublesome. It merely may expand on the idea begun in the first
sentence, to make it clear that the partnership has a right to cash in the
event promised property or services are not delivered. 6 As such, it could
relate both to obligations that purport to be present contributions and to
those that do not. The amount of a defaulting partner's cash liability,
however, is described as "the value (as stated in the certificate of limited
partnership) of the stated contribution that has not been made." Because
additional future contributions arguably are not required to be valued in
the certificate of limited partnership, 66 it may be that the drafters did not
62. Other situations could be imagined. For example, one could make an
additional, agreed, future contribution of an obligation to contribute cash or
property or to perform services in the future, followed by a failure to perform the
obligation when due.
63. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 502(a).
64. Use of the term "promise" appears to present no difficulty, as future
contributions are described in id. § 201(a)(6) as those "agreed" to be made.
65. See id. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, § 502, Comment.
66. Compare id. § 201(a)(5) with id. § 201(a)(6). The result may depend on
whether these two subsections are mutually exclusive. Although the language of
subsection (a)(5) is broad enough to include additional future contributions, this
does not appear to be the drafters' intent. See id. § 101, Comment. Morebver, it
would seem permissible for the partners simply to agree under subsection (a)(6) to
honor capital assessments, the amount of which would be determined in the
future. See Dycus v. Belco Indus., Inc., 569 P.2d 553 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
Stating a value in the certificate would be impossible in such a situation.
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intend section 502(a) to encompass the fourth situation.67 On the other
hand, if the second sentence expresses an alternative thought, indepen-
dent of the first sentence, the fact that it is inapplicable to the fourth situa-
tion would not preclude applicability of the first sentence.
What that alternative thought might be is suggested by the first situa-
tion, i.e., failure to contribute part or all of the cash, property, or services
rendered described in the certificate as having been contributed. The first
sentence of section 502(a), which refers only to failure to perform prom-
ises, clearly does not apply. The second sentence, however, by focusing on
failure to make "the required contribution of property or services" could
be viewed as an attempt to impose liability for the difference between the
contribution actually made and that stated in the certificate as having
been made. The major defect in this construction is that, by speaking ex-
clusively in terms of property and services, section 502(a) would not impose
liability for failure to make cash contributions. Additionally, the com-
ments of the drafters indicate that they did not intend the second sentence
to be independent of the first, but merely an elaboration of it.68
The second situation, i.e., failure to contribute a promissory note or
other obligation described in the certificate as having been contributed, is
not covered under any interpretation of section 502(a). The first sentence,
again, applies only to failure to perform the obligation when performance
is due. The second sentence, even if independent of the first, extends only
to the underlying property or services, not to the obligation to furnish
them.
Thus, of the four major types of potential defaults by partners regard-
ing their contributions, only one clearly is encompassed by section 502(a).
The explanation for this deficiency is not readily apparent. The drafters
might have felt that section 207, which imposes liability for false
statements in the certificate of limited partnership, provides sufficient
protection in cases involving failure to make a contribution stated to have
67. Because it applies only to "the required contribution of property or ser-
vices," the second sentence of § 502(a) also is not broad enough to cover cases in
which the additional future contribution is agreed to be an obligation to con-
tribute cash or property or to perform services.
68. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 502, Comment provides:
Although Section 17(1) of the prior uniform law required a partner
to fulfill his promise to make contributions, the addition of contributions
in the form of a promise to render services means that a partner who is
unable to perform those services because of death or disability as well as
because of an intentional default is required to pay the cash value of the
services unless the certificate of limited partnership provides otherwise.
(Emphasis added.) The Commissioners' Prefatory Note states, "[T]hose who fail
to perform promised services are required, in the absence of an agreement to the
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been made . 9 The liability imposed by section 207, however, normally will
run only to partnership creditors. As such, it will not protect other part-
ners from dilution of their investments.70 Alternatively, it may be that the
drafters were so preoccupied with the problems stemming from their
validation of obligations to contribute cash or property or to perform ser-
vices in the future that they lost sight of the other possibilities. Whatever
the reason, in terms of scope, section 502(a) hardly can be called an im-
provement over section 17 of the 1916 Act.
In the situation clearly covered, i.e., failure to perform an obligation
to furnish cash, property, or services in the future, the first sentence of sec-
tion 502(a) affirms the legal obligation of the partner to perform, while the
second prescribes the nature and amount of his or her liability. A state-
ment that a partner is obligated to the partnership to perform the promise
that is the subject matter of his or her capital contribution, even in the
event of death or disability, is unremarkable in the case of promises to fur-
nish cash or property. The general rule of contract law regarding personal
services, however, is that death or disability of the promisor will excuse
performance and any liability that otherwise would flow from nonper-
formance. 71 This rule is subject to an exception that performance will not
be excused if the contract clearly indicates that intent. 72 At first blush, sec-
tion 502(a) seems to have reversed the general rule and the exception, with
the result that death or disability would not discharge the promising part-
ner or his or her estate from performance, unless the certificate of limited
partnership provided otherwise.
Such a reversal could be justified on the basis of the special context in
which the promise to perform services in the future is made. Because the
promise may constitute a contribution to capital, giving the promisor an
equity interest in the limited partnership, nonperformance may affect
adversely both the other partners and partnership creditors. The promisor
may have been allocated partnership profits and losses and may have
received distributions on the basis of the stated value of the promised ser-
vices. 73 If, for any reason, the services are not performed, the effect will be
the same as an overstatement of the promisor's contribution, with a
resulting dilution in the other partners' investments. Section 502(a) also
69. Id. § 207.
70. Section 207 does not confine explicitly the class of potential plaintiffs to
creditors, but rather, creates a cause of action in favor of "one who suffers loss by
reliance" on a false statement. A partner, however, would have difficulty estab-
lishing the requisite reliance.
71. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 459 (1932); 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§§ 1334-1335 (1962).
72. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 459 & Comment e (1932); 6 A. COR-
BIN, supra note 71, § 1334.
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could be seen as embodying the theory that a partnership's capital
represents a trust fund for the protection of its creditors, giving them a
cushion of assets on which to rely for repayment of their claims. 74 Under
this theory, to the extent promised services are not performed, creditors
may be prejudiced.
While these two concerns may form the basis of section 502(a), a closer
analysis of that section indicates that it actually does not depart from
general contract principles, even to the extent of transposing the general
rule and its exception. In the context of a simple employment relationship,
an employer has a right to restitution of the unearned portion of a prepaid
salary in the event death or disability excuses the employee's perform-
ance.75 By permitting a promise of future services to be exchanged for a
present equity position in the enterprise, the 1976 Act creates a situation
analogous to a salary paid in advance. If death or disability prevents per-
formance of the services, the partnership should be entitled to restitution
in an amount equal to the difference between the value of the services ac-
tually performed and the original value of the property interest exchanged
therefor. By providing that the promisor "is obligated at the option of the
limited partnership to contribute cash equal to that portion of the value
(as stated in the certificate of limited partnership) of the stated contribu-
tion that has not been made," section 502(a) merely restates this restitu-
tionary measure of liability. Significantly, it does not purport to authorize
recovery by the partnership of actual damages that might be suffered from
loss of the promised services.7 6
The statement that a partner who fails to contribute promised proper-
ty or services "is obligated at the option of the limited partnership" to con-
tribute an equivalent amount of cash is somewhat puzzling. Use of the
term "option" suggests the availability of an alternative course of action,
but what that alternative might be is not clear. One possibility is that the
limited partnership has the option of not enforcing the obligation. This
interpretation, however, not only results in section 502(a)'s belaboring the
obvious, but also is defective in that it would apply, by its own terms, only
to obligations to furnish property or services. It seems doubly absurd to
codify a practical alternative open to any promisee, but to exclude from its
operation obligations to contribute cash.
74. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 168-69; text accompanying notes 27-36
supra.
75. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 468(2), Illustration 5 (1932); 6 A.
CORBIN, supra note 71, § 1368.
76. Actual damages for breach of a contract for personal services normally
will include the cost of obtaining equivalent services. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 71,
§ 1096. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329, Illustration 5 (1932). It should
be noted that § 502(a)'s restitutionary measure of recovery also applies in cases in
which general contract principles would not excuse liability for nonperformance,
such as intentional default. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 502(a) & Comment.
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The only other apparent possibility is that the drafters intended to
make available the option of specific enforcement of the obligation. This
interpretation, if not qualified, would change radically the law of con-
tracts in cases involving personal services or nonunique personal prop-
erty.7" It should not be adopted on the basis of such an ambiguous
reference. 78 The problem is compounded by the drafters' explanations of
section 502(a), which completely abandon the term "option" in favor of
mandatory language. 79 In the last analysis, it may be that the drafters were
attempting both to make clear the continuing obligation of a deceased or
disabled partner and to preserve the option of specific performance, but
only in situations in which it otherwise would be available. If this is the
case, the single sentence they have chosen appears inadequate to the task.
Finally, the effect of an assignment of a partner's interest on the
obligation to make a contribution should be noted. A simple assignment
will not make the assignee a limited partner, nor will it result necessarily in
the assignor ceasing to be a partner.8 0 In such cases the assignment should
have no effect whatsoever on the assignor's obligation to make a contribu-
tion. The assignee, however, may become a limited partner if the assignor
so provides, in accordance with authority granted by the certificate of
limited partnership, or if all other partners consent."' If the assignee
becomes a limited partner, section 704(b) provides that he or she also
becomes "liable for the obligations of his assignor to make and return con-
tributions as provided in Article 6."82 This same section contains an excep-
77. See RESTATEMENT oF CoNTRACTS §§ 360, 379 (1932); 5A A. CORBIN,
supra note 71, §§ 1143, 1204.
78. Kessler, supra note 23, at 168, states categorically that "[t]he partner-
ship cannot force the limited partner to perform the promised services; it can only
compel him to contribute in cash the difference between the value of any partial
performance and the agreed value of the services as stated in the certificate." But
see Gregory, supra note 39, at 482 ("Where the limited partner has received
substantial profits from the partnership, it seems that the partnership could opt
for equivalent services rather than cash value.").
79. For the drafters' explanation of § 502(a), see note 68 supra.
80. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 702. If the assignor assigns all of his or her in-
terest, he or she will cease to be a partner unless the partnership agreement pro-
vides otherwise. Id
81. Id. § 704(a).
82. Id. § 704(b). It should be noted that although § 704(b) speaks of
liabilities for making and returning contributions as provided in Article 6, Article
6 imposes liability only with respect to contributions that have been returned.
Liability for an unmade contribution is imposed by § 502(a), which is contained
in Article 5. Thus, either the reference to making a contribution or the reference
to Article 6 is in error. The discussion in text is based on the premise that the
reference to Article 6 is erroneous. If, instead, the reference to making a con-
tribution is the error, some of the problems discussed would be eliminated. The
latter interpretation may be supported by the drafters' apparent recognition in §
[Vol. 46592
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tion "for liabilities unknown to the assignee at the time he became a
limited partner and which could not be ascertained from the certificate of
limited partnership."83 Section 704(c) states that if the assignee becomes a
limited partner, "the assignor is not released from his liability to the
limited partnership under Sections 207 and 502."184 While these rules
largely are sensible, they do raise a few questions.
First, the exception to automatic assumption of liability by the
assignee is analogous to typical corporate law provisions exempting from
personal liability a good faith transferee of watered stock.8 5 In such cases
these provisions often expressly retain the liability of the transferor as a
necessary concomitant to release of the transferee. 86 Section 704(c) is not so
limited. It literally provides that the assignor remains liable regardless of
whether the assignee is exempted. Since the certificate of limited partner-
ship is required to set forth all obligations to make contributions, 87 it
would seem that an assignee rarely, if ever, would be exempt from this
category of liability. Thus, the result of an assignment in which the
assignee becomes a limited partner is that the partnership and its creditors
will acquire a second obligor. While this result will preclude an assignment
to an impecunious assignee as a ruse to avoid one's obligations, it also
means that a partner with an obligation to contribute capital in the future
will be unable to divorce himself or herself in good faith from the business.
As such, section 704(c) appears to be more restrictive than necessary to ac-
complish its purpose.
The exact nature of the assignor's and assignee's liability in such a case
also is unclear. The practical effect of section 704(b) is that the assignee
assumes the assignor's obligation by operation of law. By analogy to the
law of suretyship, it could be concluded that the assignee becomes the
principal obligor with the assignor remaining secondarily liable.8, Such a
result may be both equitable and in accord with the parties' intent in most
instances, but its propriety is at least questionable when the subject matter
of the obligation is services. Unfortunately, the 1976 Act offers no
guidance in resolving this issue.
704(c) that it is § 502 that imposes liability for nonperformance of an obligation
to make a contribution.
83. Id. § 704(b).
84. Id. § 704(c). This section perpetuates an error begun in § 19(7) of the
1916 Act. Section 207 imposes liability for false statements in the certificate of
limited partnership, but this liability runs to one who suffers loss by reliance on
the false statement, not to the partnership.
85. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 411 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 162(c) (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.23 (Smith-Hurd 1954); N.Y. BUS.
CORP. LAW § 628(b) (McKinney 1963).
86. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 162(c) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 628(b) (McKinney 1963).
87. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 201(a)(5)-(6).
88. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 83(c) & Comment e (1941).
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Finally, there appears to be a gap in the coverage of the statute with
respect to the continuing liability of an assignor. It is possible for an
assignor to terminate his or her status as a partner by a simple assignment
of all of his or her interest in the partnership without the assignee becom-
ing a limited partner.89 Surprisingly, the 1976 Act nowhere expressly states
that such an assignor remains liable for the performance of his or her
obligation to make a contribution. Section 704(c) clearly is confined to
situations in which the assignee becomes a limited partner. Although a
similar result could be reached when the assignee does not become a
limited partner on general principles of contract law, both certainty and
symmetry militate in favor of an explicit statutory statement to this effect.
C. Nonenforcement of Obligation
The foregoing discussion has noted the possibility that a partner's
obligation to contribute cash or property or to perform services might not
be enforced. This eventuality has at least a theoretical impact on the other
partners and on partnership creditors, and can occur in three different
situations. The first involves the existence of a contractual duty that is
discharged by compromise, and is covered by section 502(b). With respect
to the other partners, section 502(b) states, "Unless otherwise provided in
the partnership agreement, the obligation of a partner to make a contribu-
tion... may be compromised only by the consent of all the partners." 0
This provision is derived from section 17 of the 1916 Act9l and continues
the general rule that recognizes the other partners' interest in performance
of obligations to contribute capital by requiring unanimous consent to a
compromise. Unlike section 17, however, section 502(b) explicitly
authorizes the partnership agreement to vary the general rule in the in-
terest of expediency.9 2 Unanimity may be a workable rule in the context of
89. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 702.
90. Id. § 502(b). The corresponding provision of the 1916 Act was drafted in
terms of both waiver and compromise. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 17(3). "Com-
promise" denotes the settlement of a disputed claim and must be supported by
consideration. 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 71, § 1278. "Waiver," on the other hand,
has been used to describe not only agreements based on sufficient consideration,
but also unilateral, donative discharges from contractual duties. 3A id. §§ 752,
766. Because it is uncertain in what sense the 1916 Act used the term "waiver," it
equally is unclear whether the 1976 Act represents a conscious contraction of the
methods by which an obligation may be discharged or merely the elimination of a
redundancy.
91. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 17(3).
92. The law is unsettled under the 1916 Act on the question whether, absent
specific statutory permission, the partners may vary a particular provision by an
agreement that will be effective at least among themselves. Compare Lanier v.
Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 24 N.E.2d 732 (1939) with Dycus v. Belco Indus., Inc.,
569 P.2d 553 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
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a relatively small, collegial firm, but it is totally unrealistic in the context
of a large, publicly held limited partnership. Section 502(b) appears to
have sufficient flexibility to accommodate the needs of both types of enter-
prises. In addition, a partnership agreement that varies the general rule
would be executed by all partners and most commonly would vest the
power to compromise in the general partners, whose self-interest on this
issue usually would be aligned with that of the firm. Since they remain per-
sonally liable for partnership debts, one would not expect them to com-
promise other partners' obligations to make capital contributions without
good cause. Compromise of their own obligations, in view of their ultimate
unlimited liability, in many cases would be futile and, in any event, would
be subject to strict standards of fiduciary accountability.93
Regarding partnership creditors, section 502(b) provides:
Notwithstanding the compromise, a creditor of a limited partner-
ship who extends credit, or whose claim arises, after filing of the
certificate of limited partnership or an amendment thereto which,
in either case, reflects the obligation, and before the amendment
or cancellation thereof to reflect the compromise, may enforce the
original obligation.94
This provision carries over the rule of the 1916 Act95 and represents a
modification of the trust fund theory of limited partnership capital.
It has been recognized that creditors may enforce the liability of a
limited partner to the partnership under section 17 of the 1916 Act, 96 and
one would expect the same result under section 502(a). If the liability has
been compromised, however, the duty to the partnership has been extin-
guished and an alternative theory of liability becomes necessary. The
drafters of the 1916 and 1976 Acts apparently found a substitute in the
"holding-out" theory, also borrowed from corporate law.97 In the present
context, this theory would treat the contributions section of the certificate
93. See Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1067-68, 1079-80
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978). See also Riviera Congress
Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966);
Watson v. Limited Partners of WCKT, Ltd., 570 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978); Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 922, 524 P.2d 233 (1974);
Roulac, supra note 5, at 287-91.
94. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 502(b).
95. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 17(3). While continuing the basic policy of §
17(3), § 502(b) of the 1976 Act corrects a problem of overbreadth. See text ac-
companying notes 224-27 infra.
96. See Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1962); Linder
v. Vogue Invs., Inc., 239 Cal. App. 2d 338, 48 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1966); Engleman
v. Malchow, 91 Cal. App. 2d 341, 205 P.2d 413 (1949); Kittredge v. Langley, 252
N.Y. 405, 169 N.E. 626 (1930). But see Bell Sound Studios, Inc. v. Enneagram
Prods. Co:, 36 Misc. 2d 879, 234 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1962).
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of limited partnership as a continuing representation on which creditors
are entitled to rely until notified to the contrary. This theory, as embodied
in section 502(b), logically can protect only those who become creditors
during the period that the certificate of limited partnership indicates the
continuing vitality of the compromised obligation. In effect, section
502(b) presumes that such persons relied on the certificate in extending
credit and thus are entitled to protection from compromise of the obliga-
tion.9 8 Such a presumption is contrary to fact in the case of tort claimants.
Moreover, if most other creditors do not rely on the certificate of limited
partnership in making the decision whether to extend credit, 99 section
502(b) singles out one group for protection on the superficial basis of a
coincidence of timing.100
Creditors, in general, probably will have standing to enforce the un-
compromised liability of a partner under section 502(a), and at least some
creditors expressly are given standing by section 502(b) even after a com-
promise. The cases decided under the corresponding provisions of the
1916 Act seem to be developing a test for creditor standing based on the
solvency of the partnership. ' 0' Under any theory of partner liability, such a
test is sound. 0 2 That the partner's liability initially is to the partnership is
98. Cf. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 207 (imposes liability for false statements
in certificate of limited partnership, but requires showing of actual reliance by
plaintiff). Section 207(2) extends this potential liability to statements originally
true that have become false through a change in circumstances. The class of
defendants, however, is confined to culpable general partners, who have
unlimited personal liability for partnership obligations in any event. In addition,
§ 202(e) grants a 30-day grace period in which amendments to reflect a change in
a partner's obligation to make a contribution may be filed without liability. Id. §
202(b)(1), (e).
99. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
100. Cf. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 608(a)-(b) (discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 232-40 infra). In the analogous situation of a shareholder who fails to
pay the full consideration for his or her shares, California and Delaware extend
liability to all creditors, without regard to the times at which their claims arose.
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 410, 414 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§
162(a)-(b), 325 (1974). The corresponding provision of the corporation law of Il-
linois implies the same result, while that of New York is silent on this issue. See
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.23 (Smith-Hurd 1954); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
628 (McKinney 1963).
101. See cases cited note 93 supra.
102. There are two definitions of "insolvency." A debtor is insolvent under
the equity test if he or she is unable to meet his or her obligations as they mature.
Under the bankruptcy test, a debtor is insolvent if his or her liabilities exceed
assets. To the extent an insolvency test is adopted to determine creditor standing
under § 502, it is probable that the bankruptcy definition will be employed. Not
only is this definition more consistent with the trust fund theory, but it also essen-
tially is codified by § 607, which imposes a limitation on the ability of a partner-
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made clear by section 502(a). Thus, enforcement of this liability by a
creditor requires an exercise of equity jurisdiction based on the inade-
quacy of the creditor's legal remedies against the partnership. As long as
the firm remains solvent, its creditors will not have suffered such injury as
would justify the disruption of relations among the partners that such a
suit necessarily would entail. 103
The second situation in which a partner may not be required to fulfill
his or her obligation to supply cash, property, or services in the future
already has been alluded to: the partnership may choose not to enforce the
obligation. The decision whether to pursue a partnership cause of action
normally will be made solely by the general partner or partners. 104 This
result is not in conflict with section 502(b), which requires unanimous con-
sent to compromise an obligation to make a contribution. As has been
discussed, section 502(b)'s requirement of unanimity is subject to change
by agreement, most commonly one vesting the power to compromise in the
general partner or partners. In addition, unlike a compromise, a simple
decision not to enforce does not discharge the promisor's duty. As long as
the statute of limitations has not run, there remains the possibility of en-
forcement by a derivative suit instituted by any partner on behalf of the
partnership. 05 Similarly, because the duty has not been discharged, the
preceding discussion of enforcement by creditors is applicable to this situa-
tion.
The third situation in which a partner's oligation may not be enforced
derives from the introductory clause of section 502(a), which states, "Ex-
cept as provided in the certificate of limited partnership, a partner is
obligated.., to perform any promise to contribute cash or property or to
perform services . . .", This clause clearly permits the certificate to
prescribe conditions under which a partner's duty automatically will be
discharged. Although not expressly so limited, this provision seems de-
signed especially for service partners. Such persons often will contribute
future services not only because they possess some special expertise or
talent, but also because they do not have the personal capital to make con-
tributions in other forms. Section 502(a) permits service partners to share
ship to make distributions of assets to partners. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 607. If
a partner receives a return of his or her contribution under circumstances that
render the partnership involvent under this test, he or she will incur liability to the
partnership. Id. § 608(b). Because this liability is similar to liability for failure to
make a promised contribution, and because § 502(b) controls the compromise of
both types of liability, it seems likely that the bankruptcy definition will be used in
all cases arising under § 502.
103. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 414(a) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, §§ 162(a)-(b), 325 (b) (1974).
104. See 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 403.
105. See id. §§ 1001-1004.
106. Id. § 502(a).
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in future earnings of the firm with the security of knowing that if they
become disabled or die, they or their estates will not be saddled with a
monetary obligation equal to the value of the unperformed services. Since
the original certificate of limited partnership must be executed by all part-
ners,107 the effect, with respect to the other partners, often will be
equivalent to the rules regarding compromises under section 502(b).
The requirement of inclusion in the certificate also seems intended to
put partnership creditors on notice that the obligation may not be per-
formed. Although in most cases the notice will be constructive only, no
grave injustice should result. If, as argued previously, most creditors ac-
tually do not rely on the partners' capital contributions in determining
whether to extend credit, they have no cause for complaint if an obligation
to make a contribution is discharged by operation of a pre-existing,
publicly filed document.
"Certificate of limited partnership," however, is defined by the 1976
Act to include the certificate as orginally filed and as thereafter
amended.108 If the original certificate does not contain a provision under
the authority of section 502(a), it is possible to insert one by amendment.
From the creditors' perspective the crucial issue is retroactivity. While such
amendments would be expected to apply only prospectively, it is possible
that one might be attempted as a means of excusing an existing, although
unmatured, obligation. The similarity to a compromise is clear, but the
governing law is not. Unless the policy of section 502(b) regarding existing
creditors is to be subverted, the term "compromise" should be interpreted
to encompass this type of amendment.10 9
From the standpoint of the other partners, the issue is one of consent to
the dilution of one's investment and can arise whether the amendment is
retrospective or prospective. In this regard, it is important to recognize
that amendments to the certificate of limited partnership need be ex-
ecuted only by one general partner and "each other partner designated...
as a new partner or whose contribution is described as having been increas-
ed."110 In the present context this means that a provision excusing an
obligation to make a contribution theoretically could be inserted in the
certificate by the action of a single general partner. Such a procedure
stands in sharp contrast with section 502(b)'s requirement of unanimous
consent to the compromise of an obligation. Even if the partnership agree-
107. Id. § 204(a)(1).
108. Id. § 101(1).
109. Section 502(b)'s reference to an "amendment . . .to reflect the com-
promise" may be urged in support of this interpretation. The quoted language,
however, merely appears to be a recognition of the duty to amend whenever a
partner's obligation to make a contribution is compromised. See id. § 202(b)(1).
110. Id. § 2094(a)(2). Cf. 1916 A , suprai-ote 7, § 25(1)(b) (requiring
amendments to be executed by all partners).
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ment provides that unanimous consent to the specific compromise is unne-
cessary, all partners may be said to have given a general consent in advance
by executing the agreement. No such claim can be made in the present
situation unless it can be argued that the other partners have consented by
becoming members of a limited partnership governed by the 1976 Act.
Such an argument loses what little force it may have when the probability
of the other partners having read the partnership agreement is compared
with the probability of their having perused the intricacies of the 1976 Act.
Moreover, to the extent such an amendment is prospective, it cannot be
argued that it constitutes a "compromise" within the meaning of section
502(b).
Because the self-interests of general partners often may be against this
sort of maneuver and because of their fiduciary duties,"' the problem
should not be overemphasized. Additionally, the notion of consent as ap-
plied to execution of a partnership agreement may be unrealistic in the
case of large limited partnerships. Nevertheless, the ease with which
amendments to take advantage of the exception in section 502(a) may be
effected remains a deficiency in the 1976 Act. If the other partners are to
be protected fully, they must secure a provision in the partnership agree-
ment giving them the right to vote on this type of amendment.1 1 2 The dif-
ficulty of obtaining such a provision suggests that it might have been better
for the 1976 Act to have given it to them.
III. PROFITS, LOSSES, AND DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Allocation Among Partners
In sections 503 and 504, the 1976 Act provides that, in the absence of a
controlling provision in the partnership agreement, profits and losses are
to be allocated among the partners and distributions of cash or other
assets are to be made "on the basis of the value (as stated in the certificate
of limited partnership) of the contribitions made by each partner to the
extent they have been received by the partnership and have not been
returned.'11 3 The commentary to these sections notes that the 1916 Act
contains no provisions governing the sharing of profits, losses, and distri-
butions in the absence of agreement. 4 Although section 2 of the 1916 Act
requires the certificate of limited partnership to state the basis on which
limited partners share in profits, there is no similar requirement regarding
general partners.1 5 It also is possible that a certificate might omit such a
111. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
112. See 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 302, 405. But see id. §§ 302, Comment,
303.
113. Id. §§ 503-504.
114. Id. §§ 503, Comment, 504, Comment.
115. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 2(1)(a)IX.
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statement and still be accepted for filing." 6 In these cases it would be
necessary to resort to the Uniform Partnership Act to determine how prof-
its and losses would be shared.1 7 Section 18 of that Act provides that, ab-
sent agreement, profits and losses are to be shared equally by the part-
ners." 8 While equal sharing of profits and losses may be a sound default
rule in the context of a small general partnership, it hardly comports with
the expectations of one who invests in a large, modem limited partnership.
Such an investor would expect a return proportionate to the amount in-
vested. This apparently is the effect of sections 503 and 504. Although the
practical significance of these sections is reduced by the fact that virtually
all professionally drafted limited partnership agreements will contain pro-
visions specifically addressing the question of profits, losses, and distribu-
tions, they still are important in filling a gap in the 1916 Act in a way that is
appropriate to modem limited partnerships.
Because there are separate, though identical, rules for sharing profits
and losses and for sharing distributions, the clear implication is that two
different things are visualized. The 1976 Act does not make explicit the ex-
act nature of the distinction, but it is not really necessary that it do so. It
seems fairly clear that section 503 merely refers to the basis on which net
partnership profits or losses are to be apportioned among the partners on
the partnership books. Section 504 relates to the basis on which the right of
the partners actually to withdraw cash or other assets from the business is
to be allocated. It is important to note that the issue dealt with by section
504 cannot arise unless the partners have agreed that actual distributions
will be made." 9 If no such agreement exists, any net profits will be
allocated among the partners, but will remain in the firm essentially as re-
investments. It is equally important to recognize that a distribution bears
no necessary relationship to a partner's allocable share of net partnership
profit; it may be less than, equal to, or greater than such share. In other
words, the term "distribution" seems intended to encompass payments out
of current net profits, profits from previous years that may have been
closed out into the partners' capital accounts, and original capital con-
116. "A limited partnership is formed if there has been substantial com-
pliance in good faith with the requirements of paragraph (1)." Id. § 2(2).
117. "In any case not provided for in this act the rules of law and equity, in-
cluding the law merchant, shall govern." Id. § 29. The Uniform Partnership Act
provides, "[T]his act shall apply to limited partnerships except in so far as the
statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent herewith." UNIFORM PART-
NERSHIP ACT § 6(2). See Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 127-28,
125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 66 (1975); Horn v. Builders Supply Co., 401 S.W.2d 143, 148
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
118. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(a).
119. See 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 601 (discussed in text accompanying notes
127-31 infra). But see Kessler, supra note 23, at 170.
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tributions. 20 Finally, as the Comment to section 504 makes clear, distribu-
tions may be made on a completely different basis than that on which pro-
fits and losses are allocated.12' For example, the partners may agree that
while profits and losses are to be allocated in proportion to capital con-
tributions, each will have the right to withdraw an equal amount annually.
As previously stated, the default rules of sections 503 and 504 provide
for the sharing of profits, losses, and distributions on the basis of the part-
ners' contributions as listed in the certificate of limited partnership. This
will result in a relatively static ratio and must be distinguished from one
based on the amount in the various partners' capital accounts at subse-
quent points in time, such as at the beginning or end of any given account-
ing period. For example, if in a given year the partnership has a net profit,
and some partners receive a distribution while others do not, the profit
allocated to the latter normally is closed out into their capital accounts.12
Although such profit shares essentially constitute internal reinvestments in
the enterprise, the proportion on which future allocations of profits, losses,
and distributions will be based will not reflect this fact. In comparison,
sections 503 and 504 do take into account additional capital investments
from external sources because such investments will be reflected in the cer-
tificate of limited partnership.123 The contrast in treatment becomes strik-
ing when one considers that the source of such an additional, external in-
vestment may be a previous distribution of cash or other assets from the
partnership. For this reason, sections 503 and 504 may provide added in-
centive for the partners to reach their own agreement regarding these mat-
ters.
A final issue raised by these sections concerns their reference to con-
tributions "to the extent they have been received by the partnership and
have not been returned." This language, which has strong connotations of
physical transfer, may cause some interpretive problems in the context of
obligations to deliver cash or property or to perform services in the future.
As discussed previously, however, the 1976 Act appears to consider the
obligation to be a form of property.124 If this is correct, such an obligation
would be capable of being "received" by the partnership. "Return," when
employed by the 1976 Act in connection with a partner's contribution, is a
term of art that triggers certain consequences with respect to a particular
distribution of cash or other assets. 25 As such, it also would seem to be
120. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 608(c) (discussed in text accompanying notes
132 & 133 infra) provides a method to determine whether a distribution con-
stitutes a return of part or all of a partner's contribution.
121. Id. § 504, Comment.
122. H. SELLIN, supra note 55, § 10.01[4].
123. See 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 101(1), 202(b)(1).
124. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
125. See, e.g., 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 601(2), 608.
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capable of application to contributions that consist of obligations.
Moreover, an interpretation of sections 503 and 504 that encompasses
obligations to be performed in the future generally would be in accord
with the parties' intent. If a binding obligation may constitute a present
contribution, the normal expectation would be that it would generate a
present benefit. Otherwise, there would be little reason for a person to
obligate himself or herself presently.
One commentator, while agreeing with the above analysis in the
allocation of profits and losses, has suggested that any distributions should
be offset against the obligation to the extent it remains unperformed. 1 26
This suggestion is sound when applied to distributions that represent a
return of part or all of the partner's contribution, but seems overly broad if
intended to apply to distributions of earnings when the obligation is not in
default. Again, if an obligation is to constitute a present contribution, it
should be recognized not only for bookkeeping purposes under section
503, but also for actual distributions of income under section 504. In addi-
tion, if the obligation has not matured, offsetting a distribution that is not
a return of the partner's contribution would be inconsistent with the terms
of the bargain originally struck.
B. Interim Distributions
Section 601 of the 1976 Act states that, except as otherwise provided in
Article 6, a partner is entitled to distributions of cash or other assets prior
to his or her withdrawal from the firm, and prior to its dissolution:
(1) to the extent and at the times or upon the happening of the
events specified in the partnership agreement; and
(2) if any distribution constitutes a return of any part of his con-
tribution under Section 608(c), to the extent and at the times or
upon the happening of the events specified in the certificate of
limited partnership. 127
This section merely states the simple principle that the right to receive dis-
tributions, and any mechanism for determining that right, must be agreed
on by the partners. The only real problem it presents is where that agree-
ment must appear. Section 601 distinguishes distributions that represent a
return of part or all of a partner's contribution from those that do not. The
agreement respecting the former must appear in the certificate of limited
partnership, while that respecting the latter may be contained in the part-
nership agreement. The rationale for this distinction again seems to be the
trust fund theory. The premise is that partnership creditors are more en-
dangered by a return of capital to the partners than by a distribution of
current or accumulated earnings and, therefore, are entitled at least to
constructive notice of when capital distributions may occur.
126. Shapiro, The Need for Limited Partnership Reform: A Revised
Uniform Act, 37 MD. L. REV. 544, 562-63 (1978).
127. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 601.
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The difficulty is that section 601, in permitting the right to noncapital
distributions to be contained in the partnership agreement, does not coin-
cide with the requirements of the 1976 Act governing the contents of the
certificate of limited partnership. Section 201 provides, in apparently
mandatory language, that the certificate shall state both "any right of a
partner to receive, or of a general partner to make, distributions to a part-
ner which include a return of all or any part of the partner's contribution"
and "any right of a partner to receive distributions of property, including
cash from the limited partnership." 128
It might be argued that section 201 is not mandatory with respect to
noncapital interim distributions.12 9 The primary basis for such an inter-
pretation is the introductory phrase of section 601, which states that
"[e]xcept as provided in this Article," a partner is entitled to interim
distributions as set forth in section 601. This phrase could be viewed as ex-
pressly overriding section 201, with the result that inclusion in the cer-
tificate is permissive only. The more likely interpretation of this phrase,
however, is that it is simply a method of superimposing a financial solvency
limitation on distributions, contained in section 607, onto the provisions of
section 601.180 This interpretation is supported by the Comment to section
201, which states that the items it covers are matters "required" to be set
forth in the certificate.1 31 In light of this conflict, the only safe course is to
include all distribution rights in the certificate as well as in the partnership
agreement.
Section 608(c), which provides the method for determining whether a
distribution constitutes the return of a contribution, is another reason why
all distribution rights should be set forth in the certificate. Section 608(c)
states:
A partner receives a return of his contribution to the extent that a
distribution to him reduces his share of the fair value of the net
assets of the limited partnership below the value (as set forth in the
certificate of limited partnership) of his contribution which has
not been distributed to him [previously].1 2
This section, which has no counterpart in the 1916 Act, requires a com-
parison between the agreed original value of a partner's contribution and
his or her present equity in the partnership, based on current fair values.
To the extent a distribution causes the former figure to exceed the latter, it
will constitute a return of part or all of the partner's contribution. Because
128. Id. § 201(a)(9)-(10). Cf. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, §§ 2(1)(a)IX, 15 (cer-
tificate to state share of profits or other income to which each limited partner is
entitled).
129. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 169-70, 170 n.74.
130. See text accompanying notes 134-44 infra.
131. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 201, Comment.
132. Id. § 608(c).
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this is an individualized test, and because profits and losses may be
allocated on a different basis than distributions, a given distribution may
represent a return of the contributions of some partners, but not of
others. Iss For this reason alone, it is imperative that all distribution rights
be contained in the certificate.
Integrally related to sections 601 and 608(c) is section 607, which im-
poses a limitation on distributions similar to that of sections 15 and
16(1)(a) of the 1916 Act. This limitation provides that "[a] partner may
not receive a distribution from a limited partnership to the extent that,
after giving effect to the distribution, all liabilities of the limited partner-
ship, other than liabilities to partners on account of their partnership in-
terests, exceed the fair value of the partnership assets.""'s, This section, like
its predecessors, imposes an insolvency test, defined in the bankruptcy
sense, and is the simplest and most lenient of the possible restrictions on
distributions.135 The complete exclusion from the computation of
liabilities to partners on account of their partnership interests makes it
clear that section 607 does not attempt to protect different classes of part-
ners from each other or from themselves. In fact, because the only group
receiving protection is partnership creditors, who presumably would
receive substantially equivalent protection under a state's fraudulent con-
veyance law, the substantive necessity of section 607 may be open to ques-
tion.136 Its primary significance is as a method to determine the extent and
duration of the liability under section 608 of a partner who receives a
distribution. 13
Section 607, while similar to sections 15 and 16 of the 1916 Act,
changes the law in some important respects. Sections 13 and 23 of the 1916
133. For example, profits and losses may be allocated in proportion to the
partners' contributions, but distributions may be made on an equal basis. In such
a case, if initial contributions were unequal in amount, a subsequent distribution
may be a return of part or all of a small contributor's contribution while repre-
senting a distribution of current or accumulated profits with respect to a large
contributor.
134. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 607.
135. Compare id. with CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 166, 500-503 (West 1977 &
Cum. Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 160, 170 (1974 & Cum. Supp.
1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.6, .41, .48 (Smith-Hurd 1954 & Cum.
Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 510, 513 (McKinney 1963 & Cum.
Supp. 1980-1981).
136. See, e.g., UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 2, 8. In a
related context, repayment by the limited partnership of loans or other debts ow-
ing to partners, the 1976 Act eliminates a similar insolvency restriction that is
contained in the 1916 Act. Compare 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 107 with 1916
ACT, supra note 7, § 13. The apparent basis for this change is the sufficiency of
general fraudulent conveyance statutes. See 1976 ACT, supra, § 107, Comment.
137. See text accompanying notes 218-31 infra.
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Act permit limited, but not general, partners to loan money to and trans-
act business with the partnership on the same footing as outsiders. 138 As a
result, sections 15 and 16 include in the insolvency computation any
creditor claims of limited partners, but exclude those of general partners.
Sections 107 and 804 of the 1976 Act eliminate the distinction between
limited and general partners regarding the ability to assert claims against
the partnership as creditors.13 9 Consequently, section 607 includes all such
claims in computing insolvency. While this change may be viewed as the
logical quid pro quo for the elevated status given to general partners by
sections 107 and 804, it will result in making impermissible some distribu-
tions that would be permissible under the 1916 Act.
Perhaps more significant is the difference between the claims based on
equity interests that are excluded from the respective computations. Sec-
tion 15 of the 1916 Act states that a limited partner may not receive a
distribution of profits unless, after giving effect to the distribution, "part-
nership assets are in excess of all liabilities of the partnership except
liabilities to limited partners on account of their contributions and to
general partners.' 140 Section 16 imposes a substantially identical limita-
tion on the return of a limited partner's contribution. 14' Read literally, this
formula requires the excess of the value of a limited partner's equity in-
terest in the partnership over the value of his or her capital contribution to
be considered as a liability in determining whether the partnership is insol-
vent. The surely unintended effect is that any profits allocated to limited
partners on the partnership books will not be available for distribution.
This situation is corrected by section 607, which excludes the entire equity
section of the balance sheet from the computation, with the result that an
amount equal to net assets may be distributed. 
4 2
Since section 607 on its face applies to all distributions, whether of cur-
rent or accumulated profits or of the partners' contributions, it might be
expected that the 1976 Act would impose correlative liability for receipt of
any of these various types of distributions in violation of section 607. The
only section imposing liability, however, is restricted expressly to distribu-
tions that are a return of part or all of a partner's contribution.
43
Although it might appear that there is a significant gap in the coverage of
the 1976 Act in this respect, the combined effect of sections 607 and 608(c)
makes it clear that this is not the case. Under section 608(c), a distribution
constitutes a return of a partner's contribution to the extent it reduces his or
138. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, §§ 13(l), 23(1)(a), (d).
139. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 107, 804(1).
140. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 15 (emphasis added).
141. Id. § 16(1)(a).
142. See 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 101(10). See also Reiter v. Greenberg, 21
N.Y.2d 388, 235 N.E.2d 118, 288 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1968).
143. 1976'ACT, supra note 9, § 608(b).
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her share of the partnership's net assets below the stated value of his or her
contribution. Because a distribution will violate section 607 only if it ex-
ceeds net assets, to the extent a distribution violates section 607 it
necessarily will be a return of the recipient's contribution. 144
The rights of a partner with respect to an accrued, but unpaid, distri-
bution are governed by section 606, which provides, "At the time a partner
becomes entitled to receive a distribution, he has the status of, and is en-
titled to all remedies available to, a creditor of the limited partnership with
respect to the distribution.' 14 This section replaces section 16(4) of the
1916 Act, which gives a limited partner who unsuccessfully demands the
return of his or her contribution the right to have the partnership dissolved
and its affairs wound up. 146 The drafters and most commentators agree
that the remedy granted by section 16(4) is drastic; it fails to consider the
competing interests of other partners, who usually will wish the business to
continue.147 Premature dissolution, if accompanied by the termination
and winding up of the business, may sacrifice going concern value and
may also have severe tax consequences. 48 Of course, it could be argued
that the other partners easily can prevent these drastic consequences sim-
ply by returning the contribution demanded. 49
Section 606, on the other hand, has been described by one commen-
tator as a dangerous dilution of outside creditor protection because it per-
mits a partner with an equity claim to compete with such creditors for
partnership assets. 50 While the Comment to section 606 disavows such an
intent by stating that "as between the partners" a partner entitled to a
distribution is given creditor status,' 5' the statutory language is not so
144. A similar situation exists under the 1916 Act. See 1916 ACT, supra note
7, §§ 15, 16(1)(a), 17(2); A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNER-
SHIP § 46, at 263 n.26 (1968). Moreover, as discussed in text accompanying notes
140-42 supra, it seems possible to violate §§ 15 and 16(1)(a) even if a distribution
does not exceed net assets. Nevertheless, because the limitations contained in
these two sections are identical in effect, it would not seem possible to violate § 15
without also violating § 16. As a result of this redundant coverage, the liability
imposed by § 17(2) appears more than sufficient.
145. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 606.
146. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 16(4).
147. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 606, Comment; Gregory, supra note 39, at
486; Shapiro, supra note 126, at 564.
148. For a succinct description of these tax consequences, which may include
the realization of ordinary income, see Note, Procedures and Remedies in
Limited Partners' Suits for Breach of the General Partner's Fiduciary Duty, 90
HARV. L. REV. 763, 780-83 (1977).
149. If the partnership is insolvent and the limited partner is proceeding
under § 16(4)(b), it will not be possible to return his or her contribution without
violating § 16(1)(a).
150. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 171.
151. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 606, Comment.
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limited. Even so, the possibility of harmful competition seems minimal. As
long as the partnership remains an ongoing enterprise generating suffi-
cient earnings to pay creditors' claims as they mature, there is no cause for
complaint. Direct competition between partners and creditors for partner-
ship assets most commonly will occur on the liquidation of an insolvent
partnership. In such situations section 804 will control the distribution of
assets among the various parties, and this section clearly subordinates
liabilities for accrued, but unpaid, distributions to claims of creditors.1 52
Section 605 relates to the form a particular distribution may take and
contains two separate, but related, rules. The first essentially is a recodifi-
cation of section 16(3) of the 1916 Act, and states that "[e]xcept as provided
in the certificate of limited partnership, a partner, regardless of the nature
of his contribution, has no right to demand and receive any distribution
from a limited partnership in any form other than cash."' 13 The primary
significance of this provision is that it permits the enterprise to retain assets,
such as patents or real estate, that may be uniquely necessary to the contin-
uance of its operations, even over the objection of the partner who
originally contributed them. Presumably because any distribution of such
assets at the demand of a single partner could have a disruptive effect not
only on the other partners, but also on partnership creditors, any excep-
tions to the general rule must be contained in the certificate of limited
partnership. 5 4
The second sentence of section 605 relates to the converse situation,
and states that
[e]xcept as provided in the partnership agreement, a partner may
not be compelled to accept a distribution of any asset in kind from
a limited partnership to the extent that the percentage of the asset
distributed to him exceeds a percentage of that asset which is equal
to the percentage in which he shares in distributions from the
limited partnership.' 55
This provision seems important chiefly for tax reasons. For example, if a
partnership makes a current distribution of property in kind, ordinarily
neither the partnership nor the distributee partner will recognize a gain or
152. Id. § 804(l)-(2).
153. Id. § 605. Cf. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 16(3) (primary difference is that
under § 16(3) a limited partner may receive property other than cash, even if the
certificate does not so provide, if all other partners consent).
154. Section 201, which governs the contents of the certificate of limited
partnership, makes only oblique reference to this situation when it states that the
certificate shall set forth "any right of a partner to receive distributions of proper-
ty, including cash from the limited partnership." 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §
201(a)(9). Cf. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 2(l)(a)XIV (certificate required to state
any right of limited partner to receive property other than cash in return of his or
her contribution).
155. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 605.
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loss, and the partnership's basis in the property will carry over to the
distributee. 15 6 In such a case section 605 will prevent the partnership from
distributing a disproportionate share of low basis property to a particular
partner. Similarly, it will protect a partner from being forced to accept a
disproportionate amount of assets, the subsequent disposition of which
will give rise to ordinary income rather than capital gain.15 7 Apparently
because it is believed that the interests of the other partners and of partner-
ship creditors generally will be aligned in these types of situations, any ex-
ceptions to this second general rule of section 605 may be contained in the
partnership agreement rather than in the certificate of limited partner-
ship. 158
There are, however, some situations that may result in an unfair shift-
ing of tax benefits and burdens that are not encompassed by section 605.
One reason for this is that its first sentence provides that a partner has "no
right to demand and receive" a distribution other than in cash. The second
sentence states that a partner "may not be compelled to accept" a
disproportionate distribution in kind. Thus, section 605 does not preclude
the general partners from voluntarily favoring a particular partner by
distributing to him or her a disproportionate amount of high basis proper-
ty, provided that the distributee is willing to accept the favoritism.
Although the Comment to section 605 states that the second sentence pro-
tects the other partners as well as the distributee, 159 the statutory language
does not support this view.
In some circumstances a distributee partner may be prejudiced by a
distribution solely in cash, a medium that he or she is compelled to accept
by the first sentence of section 605. To the extent a cash distribution ex-
ceeds a partner's basis in his or her partnership interest, a gain will be
recognized.160 Moreover, to the extent the partnership has substantially
appreciated inventory or unrealized receivables, a cash distribution may
be treated as a sale by the partner of his or her interest in those assets, and
any gain will be treated as ordinary income rather than as capital gain. 161
The areas left untouched by section 605 once again demonstrate the im-
portance of a carefully drafted certificate of limited partnership and part-
nership agreeient.
IV. WITHDRAWAL
A. Power to Withdraw
The following discussion will consider the ability of a partner volun-
156. I.R.C. §§ 731, 732(a)(1).
157. See id. § 735(a).
158. But see 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 201(a)(9).
159. Id. § 605, Comment.
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tarily to withdraw or retire from a limited partnership and the effect of
such a withdrawal. Since both the 1916 and 1976 Acts differentiate be-
tween general and limited partners regarding these issues, the examina-
tion of their respective provisions will be segregated similarly.
The 1916 Act does not use the term "withdraw" and contains no provi-
sion that speaks directly to the power of a general partner to withdraw
from the firm. Nevertheless, section 20 clearly implies such a power by
providing that the retirement of a general partner dissolves the partner-
ship unless certain conditions are met. 162 Elucidation of this power must be
derived from the Uniform Partnership Act, indirectly referred to by sec-
tion 9's provision that "[a] general partner shall have all the rights and
powers and be subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a
partnership without limited partners. 1 63
The Uniform Partnership Act also does not use the terminology of
"withdrawal," but the provisions concerning dissolution make it clear that
a partner in a general partnership has the power to withdraw at any
time.164 Thus, it can be concluded that a general partner of a limited part-
nership formed under the 1916 Act has the power to withdraw at will.
Whether he or she has the right to withdraw is a separate issue.
General partnerships may be either partnerships at will or partnerships for
a particular term or undertaking. In the case of the former, a partner has
not only the power, but also the right, to withdraw at any time.' 65 In the
latter, a partner has the power to withdraw prior to expiration of the term or
accomplishment of the undertaking, but such withdrawal will be a breach
of contract giving the other partners a statutory cause of action for
damages.1 66 Because section 2 of the 1916 Act requires the certificate of
limited partnership to set forth "[t]he term for which the partnership is to
exist,"1 67 one could conclude that while a general partner of a limited part-
nership always has the power to withdraw, he or she never would have the
right. As a result, withdrawal prior to expiration of the term would be a
breach of contract for which the remaining partners presumably could
recover damages under section 38 of the Uniform Partnership Act.1 68 On
the other hand, section 2 requires only substantial compliance, and it
would seem possible for a certificate substantially to comply without
stating a definite term.16 9 In such a case a general partner would have both
the power and the right to withdraw at will.
162. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 20.
163. Id. § 9(1). This conclusion is reinforced byid. § 29; UNIFORM PARTNER-
SHIP ACT § 6(2).
164. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 29, 31(1)(b), (2).
165. Id. § 31(l)(b).
166. Id. §§ 31(2) & Comment, 38(2)(a)II.
167. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 2(l)(a)V.
168. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2)(a)II.
169. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 2(2). See A. BROMBERG, supra note 144, § 90B,
1981] 609
33
Hecker: Hecker: Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
The effect of withdrawal of a general partner will be dissolution of the
firm under section 20 of the 1916 Act, unless the business is continued by
the remaining general partner or partners, either under a right to do so
stated in the certificate of limited partnership or with the consent of all
members.170 Section 20 treats dissolution and continuation of the business
under either of its two conditions as mutually exclusive. This is significant
because if there is even a technical dissolution, any limited partner may
demand the return of his or her contribution.171 If the demand is not met,
he or she may force liquidation of the firm. 172 Even if those who wish to
continue the business are willing to return the contributions demanded,
the demands may outstrip the firm's liquid assets, with the end result again
being liquidation. Thus, to insure continuation of the enterprise there
must be at least one remaining general partner at the time of withdrawal
and the right to continue must be stated in the certificate. If there is not at
least one remaining general partner, the continuation provisions of section
20 are inoperative by their own terms. If the right is not given by the cer-
tificate, unanimous consent to continuation is necessary. Consequently,
any single partner has the power to force dissolution and winding up.
The operation of these provisions, especially in the case of a limited
partnership for a definite term, can be severe. The simple withdrawal of a
general partner may give limited partners the right to demand the return
of their contributions, which in turn may force an end to the enterprise.Is
The only justification for this result is that the limited partner's original in-
vestments may have been made in reliance on the continued association of
a particular general partner with the firm, especially since control of the
business is vested exclusively in the general partners.1 74 It may be ques-
tioned, however, whether this possible reliance interest is sufficient to
justify the potentially drastic relief afforded by the 1916 Act.
The 1976 Act, in section 602, speaks specifically to the power of a
general partner to withdraw:
A general partner may withdraw from a limited partnership at any
time by giving written notice to the other partners, but if the
withdrawal violates the partnership agreement, the limited part-
nership may recover from the withdrawing general partner
damages for breach of the partnership agreement and offset the
damages against the amount otherwise distributable to him."7
at 517 & n.1; Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution- Causes, Consequences, and
Cures, 43 TEX. L. REV. 631, 641 (1965). See also 1916 ACT, supra, § 16(2)(c).
170. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 20. See id. §§ 2(1)(a)XIII, 9(1)(g).
171. Id. § 16(2)(a).
172. Id. § 16(4). See note 148 and accompanying text supra.
173. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2)(b) is similar. If a partner
wrongfully dissolves the firm, the innocent partners have a statutory option to
continue the business, but only if all agree. See id. § 38(2)(a)I.
174. 1916 ACT, supraziote 7, §§ 7, 9(1), 10.
175. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 602.
610 [Vol. 46
34
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss3/3
ULPA FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
The primary virtue of section 602 is that it obviates the necessity of referr-
ing to the Uniform Partnership Act to determine the power and the right of
a general partner to withdraw from a limited partnership. It makes clear
that a general partner always will have the power to withdraw. Whether he
or she also will have the right depends on the terms of the partnership
agreement.
On its surface, section 602 does not appear to change existing law
significantly. The clause giving the partnership a cause of action for
damages if the withdrawal "violates the partnership agreement," however,
is troublesome. Although it is clearer under the 1976 Act than under the
1916 Act that a limited partnership may exist at will, 1 6 it is obvious that a
definite term or particular undertaking also may be agreed on.1 7The dif-
ficulty is that any such term or undertaking must be set forth in the cer-
tificate of limited partnership. 7 8 Similarly, the certificate must include
any agreement respecting "the time at which or the events on the happen-
ing of which a partner may terminate his membership in the limited part-
nership."'179 While many partnership agreements restate the items in-
cluded in the certificate, this is not always the case. As a result, section 602's
exclusive reference to the partnership agreement seems too narrow.18 0
The effect of a general partner's withdrawal under the 1976 Act is
much the same as it is under the 1916 Act. It will result in dissolution and
winding up under section 801, unless the business is continued by the re-
maining general partner or partners under a right stated in the certificate,
or unless all partners agree within ninety days to continue the business
and, if necessary, to appoint one or more additional general partners.' 8 l
The primary difference between the 1916 and 1976 Acts involves the
withdrawal of a sole general partner. Under section 20 of the 1916 Act, at
least a technical dissolution is inevitable in such a situation. Under section
801, dissolution may be prevented by appointment of a successor general
partner within ninety days after the withdrawal. The more serious prob-
lem that exists under the 1916 Act, the ability of a single dissenter to pre-
vent continuation of the business unless there are both a remaining general
partner and a right to continue stated in the certificate, is not rectified by
the 1976 Act. In fact, section 801 may be a step backwards because, unlike
176. Id. § 201(a)(11). See id. § 603.
177. Id. § 201(a)(11).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 201(a)(8). This provision closely parallels § 603, which controls
withdrawal of limited partners. On its face, however, it applies to all partners,
both general and limited. See id. § 101(8).
180. Id. § 101(9) defines "partnership agreement" as "any valid agreement,
written or oral, of the partners as to the affairs of a limited partnership and the
conduct of its business." Although this definition is broad enough to encompass
the certificate as a part of the partnership agreement, the remainder of the 1976
Act seems to view the two terms as mutually exclusive. See, e.g., id. §§ 601, 605.
181. Id. § 801(3). See id. §§ 201(a)(12), 401.
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section 20, it mandates not only dissolution, but also winding up, in every
instance in which it applies. Retention of the requirement of unanimity is
questionable from a policy standpoint and seems inconsistent with section
606, which gives partners creditor status with respect to accrued, but un-
paid, distributions, but which removes their right to have the firm dis-
solved. 182
Finally, it should be noted that "an event of withdrawal of a general
partner," as used in section 801, is a term of art with a broader meaning
than the simple voluntary retirement from the business contemplated by
section 602. It encompasses such additional occurrences as assignment of a
general partner's entire partnership interest, removal, insolvency, death,
and incompetency. 83
In contrast to its coverage of general partners, the 1916 Act is explicit
and restrictive regarding the withdrawal of a limited partner. Provided
that the partnership is solvent, section 16 permits a limited partner to
withdraw his or her contribution in the following four circumstances: (1) if
all members consent; (2) if the partnership has been dissolved; (3) if the
date set in the certificate for return of the limited partner's contribution
has arrived; or (4) if no time is set in the certificate for either dissolution or
return of the limited partner's contribution, on six months' prior written
notice to all members. 184 Section 16 focuses exclusively on severance of a
limited partner's financial, not personal, relationship with the firm.
Because severance of personal ties is not addressed by the 1916 Act and
withdrawal of a capital contribution does not necessarily import such a
severance, it seems possible for a limited partner to remain a member even
after the return of his or her contribution. 185 Conversely, a person could
relinquish membership while leaving his or her capital at the risk of the
business. 186 Normally, however, a limited partner would not wish to
disassociate himself or herself from the partnership without the return of
his or her contribution. Thus, section 16 effectively restricts the ability of a
limited partner to withdraw at will (on six months' notice) to situations in
which the certificate specifies neither a time for dissolution nor a time for
return of the limited partner's contribution.
182. See id. § 606 & Comment. One explanation for the difference between §
606 and § 801 is the possibility of investment in reliance on a particular general
partner. See text accompanying note 174 supra. This possibility is present in cases
falling under § 801, but not in those falling under § 606.
183. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 101(3), 402.
184. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 16(1)(a)-(b), (2). See id. § 2(1)(a)V, VIII.
185. See Wilson v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 613, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
Such a limited partner would continue to possess the rights enumerated in 1916
ACT, supra note 7, § 10.
186. Cf. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 11 (providing that person who contributes
capital to business in the erroneous belief that he or she is a limited partner may
avoid general liability by renouncing his or her interest in income of business).
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This restriction presumably stems from the role of limited partners as
suppliers of capital and the necessity of maintaining a reliable and predict-
able amount of capital in the business. Moreover, this limitation on the
freedom of limited partners to withdraw is justifiable. The power of a
general partner to withdraw at will is supported on an agency basis. 18 7 It is
fundamental that an agency relationship is dependent on the continuing
consent of both the principal and the agent and that either may withdraw
such consent at any time, even though to do so may be a breach of con-
tract.1 88 Both as an agent rendering services for the partnership and as a
principal with unlimited liability for the acts of other agents, a general
partner may not be forced to continue in the business against his or her
will. In contrast, a limited partner is not in an agency relationship by vir-
tue of his or her membership in the firm. In fact, the 1916 Act does not
treat such investors as true partners in any sense. 89 He or she may not con-
tribute services to the partnership's capital, and his or her liability is
limited to the amount invested. 90 For these reasons, section 16's restric-
tions on withdrawal strike a good balance between the interests of the part-
nership and the interests of its limited partners.
Unlike the withdrawal of a general partner, withdrawal of a limited
partner will not dissolve the partnership under the 1916 Act. 91 If,
however, a limited partner rightfully, but unsuccessfully, attempts to
withdraw his or her contribution, he or she may have the partnership
dissolved and its affairs wound up. 92
Section 603 of the 1976 Act provides for the withdrawal of limited
partners as follows:
A limited partner may withdraw from a limited partnership at the
time or upon the happening of events specified in the certificate of
limited partnership and in accordance with the partnership agree-
ment. If the certificate does not specify the time or the events upon
the happening of which a limited partner may withdraw or a
definite time for the dissolution and winding up of the limited
partnership, a limited partner may withdraw upon not less than 6
months' prior written notice to each general partner at his address
on the books of the limited partnership at its office in this State.1 93
187. A. BROMBERG, supra note 144, §§ 75(a), 90B(b).
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1(1), 118 & Comment b-c
(1957).
189. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 1, Comment; A. BROMBERG, supra note 144,
§ 90B(a); Bromberg, supra note 169, at 640.
190. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, §§ 1, 4.
191. Id. §§ 1, Comment, 20 (by implication). See Wilson v. United States,
246 F. Supp. 613, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1965); Brown v. Brown, 15 Ariz. App. 333,
337, 488 P.2d 689, 693 (1971); Bromberg, supra note 169, at 641, 643.
192. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 16(4).
193. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 603.
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Although this provision is derived from section 16 of the 1916 Act, 1 94 it dif-
fers from its source in a number of respects. First, it purports only to
govern the severance of a limited partner's personal relationship with the
firm and not his or her financial relationship. The latter is covered
separately in section 604, discussed below. 195 For this reason, section 16's
requirement that the partnership be solvent has been omitted. Similarly,
the reference to withdrawal on dissolution has been dropped. If the part-
nership has been dissolved, the element of personal association already will
have been terminated. The question of distribution of assets properly is
left to section 804, the general provision governing liquidating distribu-
tions. 196
A second change made by section 603 is the elimination of express per-
mission to withdraw on the consent of all other members. The purpose and
effect of this change are unclear; there appears to be no reason why a
limited partner should not be able to withdraw if no one objects. It is possi-
ble that the drafters believed the express permission of section 16 was
superfluous, but the same criticism could be made in other situations in
which unanimous consent provisions have been retained. 197 In addition,
one would expect an elimination on the ground of superfluity at least to be
mentioned in the drafters' comments. 98 Because it is uncertain whether
the drafters affirmatively intended to change the law in this regard and, if
so, what the policy basis of the change might be, it is hoped that section
603 will not be interpreted as impliedly prohibiting withdrawal on
unanimous consent.
Section 603 also makes several changes in the operative details of those
provisions that have been carried over from section 16. A limited partner
may withdraw either at the time or on the occurrence of the events
specified in the certificate of limited partnership. Thus, contingent powers
to withdraw specifically are authorized. In either case, however, a limited
partner must comply with any procedures established by the partnership
agreement. He or she also may withdraw on six months' prior written
notice if the certificate specifies neither the time or events giving a right to
withdraw nor a definite time for dissolution and winding up of the part-
nership. Inclusion of the adjective "definite" is especially significant
because it permits withdrawal on six months' notice in situations where the
certificate sets a term for the partnership that is indefinite or is measured
by events of indefinite occurrence. 99 Finally, the necessary recipients of
the notice sensibly have been confined to the general partners.
194. Id. § 603, Comment.
195. See text accompanying notes 206-15 infra.
196. See 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 804.
197. See, e.g., id. §§ 301(a)(1), 704(a)(2), 801(2).
198. Compare id. § 603, Comment with id. § 703, Comment.
199. See id. § 201(a)(11); A. BROMBERG, supra note 144, § 90B, at 517 n.1;
Bromberg, supra note 169, at 641 & n.58.
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Notwithstanding these changes, the ability of a limited partner to
withdraw remains more restricted than that of a general partner. As
discussed previously, the 1916 Act's distinction in treatment seems to be
premised on the differing roles of general and limited partners -general
partners are both principals and agents in the business while limited part-
ners are inactive suppliers of capital. Thus, general partners always must
have the power to sever their personal relationships with the firm, but
limited partners need not, and should not, be given a coextensive power to
sever their financial relationships. The 1976 Act continues the basic dif-
ference in the respective roles of general and limited partners. 200 Although
the restrictions on withdrawal contained in section 603 are similar to those
of section 16, on their face they are wide of the mark because they concern
exclusively a limited partner's personal, rather than financial, relationship
with the firm. It may be questioned, therefore, whether there is any count-
ervailing partnership interest that would justify these restrictions on a
limited partner's power to disassociate his or her person, as distinguished
from finances, from the enterprise.
The answer may be found in section 604, which entitles any withdraw-
ing partner, general or limited, to a distribution in the amount of his or
her interest in the partnership.20' A partner normally will not wish to
withdraw without a concurrent recovery of his or her investment. As a
practical matter, the combination of sections 602 and 604 implements the
policy permitting general partner withdrawal at will, while the combina-
tion of sections 603 and 604 implements the policy protecting the financial
integrity of the firm against precipitous limited partner withdrawal.
The view that section 603 ultimately is concerned with matters of
finance is reinforced by section 702, which states that unless the partner-
ship agreement provides otherwise, a partnership interest is assignable,
and a person ceases to be a partner on the assignment of his or her entire
partnership interest. 202 Assuming the availability of potential assignees,
section 702 effectively permits a limited partner to discontinue his or her
personal relationship with the firm at will. Whether the assignment is
gratuitous or for value, however, it will not occasion the distribution of any
partnership assets.
Finally, although a limited partner is considered to be a "partner" by
the 1976 Act, 203 his or her withdrawal continues to have no effect with
regard to dissolving the partnership. 204 Unlike the situation under the 1916
Act, however, a limited partner who does not receive the distribution to
which he or she is entitled possesses no statutory right to have the firm
200. See 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 303(a), 403.
201. Id. § 604. See text accompanying notes 206-15 infra.
202. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 702.
203. Id. § 101(8).
204. Id. § 801 & Comment (by implication).
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dissolved and its affairs wound up. Rather, he or she merely is given the
status of a partnership creditor with respect to the distribution. 205
B. Distribution on Withdrawal
Section 604, which has no counterpart in the 1916 Act, provides a
method for determining the distribution to which a partner is entitled on
withdrawal. It states:
Except as provided in this Article, upon withdrawal any withdraw-
ing partner is entitled to receive any distribution to which he is en-
titled under the partnership agreement and, if not otherwise pro-
vided in the agreement, he is entitled to receive, within a
reasonable time after withdrawal, the fair value of his interest in
the limited partnership as of the date of withdrawal based upon his
right to share in distributions from the limited partnership. 20 6
As in section 601(1),207 the reference to "partnership agreement" is
troublesome in light of section 201's apparent requirement that, if agreed
on, the certificate shall state "the amount of, or the method of deter-
mining, the distribution to which... [a withdrawing partner] may be en-
titled respecting his partnership interest, and the terms and conditions of
the... distribution." 208 Once again, because section 604 begins with the
phrase, "Except as provided in this Article," it may override section 201,
with the effect that the latter's provision is permissive rather than man-
datory. 20 9 Unlike the situation under section 601, however, there appears
to be no logical explanation of why the drafters would wish to make a cer-
tificate provision regarding this important matter permissive only, and
why, in either case, they would choose such an obscure and tortured
method of accomplishing the result. Moreover, their intent not to do so is
even clearer in the case of section 604. Not only does the Comment to sec-
tion 201 speak in terms of the matters "required" to be set forth in the cer-
tificate, but it specifically states that one of the two principal functions of
the certificate is "to place creditors on notice of the facts concerning the
capital of the partnership and the rules regarding additional contributions
to and withdrawals from the partnership. 210 Consequently, the introduc-
tory "except" phrase again merely seems to be a means to incorporate the
general insolvency limitation on distributions, contained in section 607,
into the framework of section 604.211
If the partners have not agreed on the distribution to which a with-
drawing partner is entitled, section 604 provides for a distribution equal to
205. Id. § 606. See text accompanying notes 145-52 supra.
206. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 604.
207. See text accompanying notes 127-31 supra.
208. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 201(a)(8). See id. § 201(a)(9)-(10).
209. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 169-70 & n.74.
210. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 201, Comment (emphasis added).
211. See text accompanying notes 134-44 supra.
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"the fair value of his interest in the limited partnership as of the date of
withdrawal based upon his right to share in distributions from the limited
partnership. 212 In this single clause, the drafters have created a statutory
right to a distribution, provided a method of determining the amount of
the distribution, and fixed the effective date for such determination.
The most critical concept embodied in this portion of section 604 is
that the value of a partner's interest in the partnership is to be calculated
on the basis of his or her other distribution rights. Partners may share in
distributions in any manner on which they agree, and absent agreement,
they share in proportion to the stated value of their respective capital con-
tributions to the extent received by the partnership and not returned. 213
Thus, if distributions are made in proportion to each partner's capital con-
tribution, a withdrawing partner's distributive share will be equal to the
fair value of the partnership's net assets as of the date of withdrawal
multiplied by the percentage of total contributions that his or her con-
tribution represents. If distributions are made equally to all partners, a
withdrawing partner's distributive share will be equal to the fair value of
212. It is clear that the drafters intended § 604 to be read alternatively; a
withdrawing partner is entitled to receive either the distribution provided by the
partnership agreement or, if the agreement is silent, the fair value of his or her in-
terest in the partnership. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 604, Comment. This also is
the interpretation uniformly assumed by the commentators. See Gregory, supra
note 39, at 485; Kessler, supra note 23, at 171; Shapiro, sup'ra note 126, at
565-66. Unfortunately, § 604 abandons the clear two-sentence structure used in
other default provisions. See, e.g., 1976 ACT, supra, §§ 503-504, 603. Instead, it
states that a withdrawing partner "is entitled to receive any distribution to which
he is entitled under the partnership agreement and, if not otherwise provided in
the agreement, he is entitled to receive ... the fair value of his interest in the
limited partnership." Id. § 604 (emphasis added). This language makes it possi-
ble to interpret § 604 as entitling a withdrawing partner to any distribution pro-
vided in the agreement and, in addition, to the fair value of his or her interest in
the partnership, unless the agreement negates the latter. For example, a partner-
ship agreement might provide that a withdrawing partner is entitled to the return
of his or her original capital contribution. See, e.g., 1 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON,
CURRENT LEGAL FORMS Form 2.01 (1980). In such a case, § 604 could be inter-
preted to entitle a partner not only to the return of his or her contribution, but
also to any accretions to that contribution derived from profitable operations.
Such an interpretation would be contrary both to the intent of the drafters and to
the intent of the partners, who usually would view their agreement regarding
distribution rights as exclusive. Moreover, because § 604 entitles a partner to the
fair value of his or her interest in the partnership, which generally would include
his or her original capital contribution, there would be considerable overlap be-
tween the distribution covered by the agreement and that granted by § 604. For
all of these reasons, § 604 should be interpreted as providing for mutually ex-
clusive alternatives.
213. 1976 ACT, supra'note 9, § 504. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
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the partnership's net assets as of the date of withdrawal divided by the total
number of partners. In this regard, it is important to note that partnership
profits and losses may be allocated on a different basis than that on which
distributions are made.214 Section 604's exclusive reference to distributions
makes it clear that, to the extent there is a difference, the partners'
distribution rights will control. 215
C. Liability on Return of Contribution
Although it is possible for a partner to receive the return of part or all
of his or her contribution in the context of an interim distribution, 21 6 such
a return most often will occur on withdrawal. 217 Both the 1916 and 1976
Acts provide for the liability of a partner who receives the return of his or
her contribution either rightfully or wrongfully, and also for compromise
of the liability of a partner in the latter instance. While the 1976 Act makes
a number of changes in detail, it continues the basic thrust of the 1916 Act.
The following discussion first will outline the three basic rules common to
both Acts, noting the changes effected by the 1976 Act, and will conclude
with an examination of the policy choices represented by those three rules.
Both Acts distinguish a rightful from a wrongful distribution of a part-
ner's contribution on the dual bases of whether it violates the arrangement
of the partners, inter se, and whether the partnership is insolvent or will be
214. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 503-504 & Comment. See text accompany-
ing note 121 supra.
215. It should be mentioned that in § 604 the drafters have departed from
their otherwise uniform use of the term "partnership interest, " in favor of "in-
terest in the limited partnership." Compare 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 604 with
id. §§ 301(a), 701-703, 704(a), (c), 804(3). Because "partnership interest" is
defined as "a partner's share of the profits and losses of a limited partnership and
the right to receive distributions of partnership assets," id. § 101(10), it has been
suggested that the change was necessary to avoid circularity. Kessler, supra note
23, at 171 n.89. The circularity, however, would seem no worse than § 604's inter-
nal circularity in defining a partner's right to a distribution on withdrawal by
reference to his or her right to share in partnership distributions. Alternatively,
the drafters may have believed different terminology was required because the
distributive share is to be calculated without regard to the partnership's method
of allocating profits and losses. Unfortunately, a similar problem is solved in §
804(3) by providing that on winding up, a partnership's assets are to be
distributed, inter alios, to partners "respecting their partnership interests, in the
proportions in which the partners share in distributions." The confusion is com-
pounded by the Comment to § 804 which, like § 604, speaks of "interests in the
partnership." Probably the safest conclusion is that no difference in meaning was
intended and that § 604's terminology merely is the result of a drafting oversight.
216. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 601(2), 608(c). See text accompanyingnotes
132 & 133 supra.
217. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§ 604, 608(c).
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rendered insolvent by the distribution. 218 Because the ultimate question
most often will be the extent of the recipient partner's liability to partner-
ship creditors, the latter criterion is more significant. 219
Under the 1916 Act, a limited partner holds as trustee for the partner-
ship any money or other property received as a wrongful return of his or
her contribution.220 The 1976 Act eliminates the term "trustee," but
recodifies the trust fund theory by imposing monetary liability in the
amount of the contribution wrongfully returned.221 It also broadens the
class of partners covered to include general as well as limited partners and
adds a six-year statute of limitations. 222
The liability of a limited partner who has received a wrongful return of
his or her contribution may be compromised under the 1916 Act by the
unanimous consent of the partners. 223 No compromise, however, is effec-
tive against a partnership creditor "who extended credit or whose claim
arose after the filing and before a cancellation or amendment of the cer-
tificate." 224 This provision, which is based on the holding-out theory, at-
tempts to protect those who may have extended credit to the partnership in
reliance on the certificate of limited partnership during the period it
reflected the withdrawn capital contribution. As drafted, however, it is
broader than necessary to accomplish this purpose. The original cer-
tificate, of course, will not reflect the contributions of subsequently admit-
ted limited partners. Thus, it would be impossible for creditors who extend
credit during the period between the original filing date and the date of an
amendment reflecting the admission of a new limited partner to rely on
the certificate with respect to the contribution of that limited partner. "25
218. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 16(1)-(2); 1976 ACT, supra note 9, §§
607-608(a)-(b).
219. Both Acts formulate the recipient partner's liability initially as liability
to the partnership, but it may be enforced by partnership creditors if the partner-
ship is, or becomes, insolvent. See cases cited note 96 supra.
220. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 17(2)(a)-(b).
221. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 608(b).
222. Id.
223. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 17(3). Although § 17(3) begins by stating that
"[t]he liabilities of a limited partner as set forth in this section can be waived or
compromised," it is apparent that it is not meant to apply to the liability under §
17(4) of a limited partner who has received the return of his or her contribution
rightfully. While this conclusion is suggested by the mere placement of the sub-
sections, it is made definite by the fact that the number of classes of creditors to
which a partner is exposed is greater under § 17(3) than under § 17(4). Thus, if §
17(3) applied to the compromise of liability premised on § 17(4), it would result in
an increase, rather than a decrease, in potential liability.
224. Id. § 17(3).
225. The certificate must be amended on the admission of any new or
substituted limited partner. Id. § 24(2)(b)-(c).
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Nevertheless, such creditors apparently have the right to enforce any
liability arising from the wrongful return of such a limited partner's con-
tribution. The 1976 Act, in addition to authorizing compromises by less
than unanimous consent if permitted by the partnership agreement226 and
expanding its coverage to include general partners, corrects this defect. It
states that, notwithstanding the compromise of a partner's obligation to
repay a wrongfully withdrawn contribution, "a creditor... who extends
credit, or whose claim arises, after the filing of the certificate of limited
partnership or an amendment thereto which, in either case, reflects the
obligation, and before the amendment or cancellation thereof to reflect
the compromise, may enforce the original obligation." 227
Even if a limited partner has secured the return of his or her contribu-
tion rightfully, the 1916 Act imposes continuing liability "for any sum, not
in excess of such return with interest, necessary to discharge [the partner-
ship's] liabilities to all creditors who extended credit or whose claims arose
before such return." 228 Because the partnership must be solvent at the time
of a distribution in order for it to be rightful, the effect of this provision is
to shift partially the risk of subsequent insolvency from existing creditors
to the withdrawing limited partner, who will bear this risk as long as any
existing creditor remains unpaid.229 The provision also suffers from a
problem of overbreadth in the case of subsequently admitted limited part-
ners similar to that present in the provision governing compromises of
liability for wrongful returns. The drafters of the 1976 Act have accepted
the proposition that there should be continuing liability, but have amelio-
rated some of the harshness of the 1916 Act in the following ways: the pro-
vision authorizing recovery of interest in addition to the principal amount
of the contribution has been omitted; a short, one-year statute of limita-
tions has been added; and the class of creditors covered has been narrowed
to include only those "who extended credit to the limited partnership dur-
ing the period the contribution was held by the partnership." 230 It should
226. See text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
227. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 502(b). Use of the term "obligation" is not
strictly accurate in this context because the certificate will reflect only the con-
tribution, not the obligation to repay it. The intent of the drafters, however, is
clear. Their choice of terminology probably is because this same sentence also
governs the effect of the partners' compromise of an obligation to make a con-
tribution in the future. Such an obligation would be set forth in the certificate.
Id. § 201(a)(5)-(6).
228. 1916 ACT, supra note 7, § 17(4). This subsection literally imposes liabil-
ity on any "contributor," but it is clear from the title of § 17, the remainder of its
provisions, and the entire 1916 Act that only limited partners were intended to be
covered. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 531(d) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1980-1981)
(substituting "limited partner" for "contributor").
229. See Kittredge v. Langley, 252 N.Y. 405, 169 N.E. 626 (1930).
230. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 608(a).
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be noted that this last modification has two separate effects. It corrects the
overbreadth problem by eliminating those who extended credit prior to
the time the contribution was made and, by deleting the phrase "or
whose claims arose," it effectively excludes tort claimants regardless of
when the tort occurred. Finally, consistent with the other provisions of the
1976 Act, the class of partners subject to liability has been broadened to in-
dude general partners. 23'
Notwithstanding all the changes, it is clear that the basic policies con-
cerning the return of partners' contributions that are embodied in the
1916 Act have been carried over by the 1976 Act. The nature, effect, and
possibly even the wisdom of these policies remain to be considered. As is
already apparent, three separate situations are involved. In the first,
which will be referred to as "wrongful return," the return of a partner's
contribution is wrongful because the partnership is insolvent or will be
rendered insolvent by the distribution. 23 2 The second, which will be re-
ferred to as "compromise," is similar to the first except that the partner's
liability for receipt of a wrongful distribution is compromised by his or her
fellows. In the third, which will be referred to as "rightful return," the
distribution is rightful because the partnership is neither insolvent nor will
it be rendered insolvent by the distribution.
The creditors whose rights are involved directly or indirectly also may
be divided into three categories, depending on the time at which they
became creditors of the partnership. Those who became creditors before
the return of a contribution will be referred to as "prior creditors"; those
who became creditors subsequent to the return, but before amendment of
the certificate to reflect that fact will be referred to as "interim creditors";
and those who became creditors only after amendment of the certificate
will be referred to as "subsequent creditors."
In the case of a wrongful return, the recipient will remain liable to the
partnership for a period of six years, and this liability apparently will re-
dound to the benefit of all three classes of creditors. 233 If this liability is
231. Id.
232. See id.§ 607.
233. Although § 608(b), which imposes liability in the wrongful return situa-
tion, is drafted only in terms of liability to the partnership, the case law under the
1916 Act makes it fairly clear that this liability may be enforced by creditors on
insolvency of the partnership. See cases cited note 96 supra. Moreover, because in
the compromise and rightful return situations the classes of creditors protected
are defined in a way that excludes subsequent creditors, it may be inferred that in
the wrongful return situation they are intended to be included in the group
receiving protection. Compare 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 608(b) with id. §§
502(b), 608(a). This approach should be distinguished from that of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Section 8, which specifically applies to conveyances
by insolvent partnerships, protects only existing creditors. Other provisions of
general application, however, expressly include subsequent creditors and may be
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compromised by the partnership, subsequent creditors are excluded while
prior and interim creditors continue to receive protection. Finally, in the
rightful return situation, only the interests of prior creditors are recog-
nized. Thus, on the surface, the 1976 Act achieves symmetry-as the
degree of the recipient's real or supposed culpability gradually decreases
from the wrongful return to the rightful return situation, so does the
number of different classes of creditors to which he or she is exposed.
Beyond this, however, the scheme of liability for a withdrawn contribution
under the 1976 Act raises some serious questions.
The contrast between the wrongful return situation and the com-
promise situation is particularly striking. As noted before, in the case of a
wrongful return both interim and subsequent creditors receive protection,
but in the case of a compromise, subsequent creditors are eliminated. It
might be argued that subsequent creditors are not deserving of protection
because they knowingly have extended credit to an insolvent partnership.
But this argument is equally applicable to the wrongful return situation, in
which liability to subsequent creditors is preserved. It also is applicable to
interim creditors in either of the two situations, and possibly even to ex-
isting creditors if the partnership was insolvent prior to the distribution,
rather than being rendered insolvent by it. Indeed, even though the part-
nership may be insolvent under the bankruptcy definition employed by
section 607, if it is able to meet its obligations as they mature, an extension
of credit may be reasonable.
It could be argued that interim and subsequent creditors should be
differentiated in the compromise situation because the latter, having ex-
tended credit subsequent to amendment of the certificate to reflect the
compromise, could not have relied on the continuing viability of the recip-
ient partner's contribution. Once again, however, the same may be said in
the wrongful return situation, in which liability is preserved. 234 In addi-
tion, most creditors probably do not rely on the certificate of limited part-
nership in any meaningful way. 23 5 Thus, any distinction between interim
and subsequent creditors on this basis is largely fictional. Finally, the fact
that claims of interim tort, as well as contract, creditors are preserved in
the compromise situation further undercuts the credibility of any distinc-
tion premised on reliance on the certificate. 236
relied on in some cases. Compare UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 8
with id. §§ 5-7. See Hartnett v. Doyle, 16 Tenn. App. 302, 64 S.W.2d 227 (1932);
Bridgman, Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L. REV.
530, 531, 537 (1923).
234. It should be noted that the certificate must be amended whether the
return of a contribution is rightful or wrongful and, if wrongful, whether or not
there is a compromise. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 202(b)(1).
235. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
236. See 1976 ACT, supra note 9, § 502(b).
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It must be stressed that the only functional difference between the two
situations is that in one the partner's liability for a wrongfully returned
contribution has been compromised by his or her fellow partners. As
previously discussed in a slightly different context, because the com-
promise extinguishes the partner's liability to the partnership, the drafters
must have felt that any continuing liability to creditors must be on the
basis of the holding-out theory.23 7 The logic of this theory, of course,
precludes liability to those who become creditors subsequent to amend-
ment of the certificate. This purely theoretical reason is insufficient to
justify the disparate treatment that necessarily flows from it. A partner
who wrongfully receives the return of his or her contribution either should
or should not be liable, as a matter of policy, to persons who become
creditors after the return. 28 Regardless of which way this basic issue is
resolved, distinctions should not be drawn on the basis of whether the
creditor acquired that status before or after amendment of the certificate,
nor on whether the other partners have compromised the recipient's
liability to the partnership.
With respect to rightful returns, it seems paradoxical that a partner
should incur any liability whatsoever. To the extent that the return of a
contribution may be rightful and at the same time dangerous to existing
creditors, it would appear that the statute is defective. It is clear, however,
that such a situation could exist. For example, a partnership may have a
positive net worth and yet be unable to meet its obligations as they become
due. In such a case a distribution of liquid assets to a partner, although
permissible under section 607, could well jeopardize the position of part-
nership creditors.
There are two ways in which this situation could be remedied. The first
would be to make the standard for rightful distributions in section 607
more stringent, e.g., by imposing an equity insolvency test in addition to
the bankruptcy test. 239 The second, that chosen by the drafters, would be
237. See text accompanying notes 96-98 supra.
238. A partner who actually withdraws assets of the business at a time when it
is insolvent probably should incur liability in the amount of the withdrawal to
both existing and future creditors. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
ACT §§ 5-6 (certain analogous conveyances fraudulent as to present and future
creditors). Such a result seems necessary, particularly in the case of tort claimants
and trade creditors, if the distinction between ownership and creditor status is to
retain significance. This situation may be distinguished from the compromise of
an obligation to make a future contribution. See text accompanying notes 94-100
supra. In the latter case, hard assets are not removed from the enterprise and,
more importantly, the partnership is not necessarily insolvent.
239. Nevada's version of § 17(4) of the 1916 Act reads as follows:
When a contributor has rightfully received the return in whole or in
part of the capital of his contribution, he is nevertheless liable to the
partnership for any sum, not in excess of such return with interest,
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to impose continuing liability on the recipient partner for some period,
notwithstanding the fact that the distribution was rightful. This method
seems less preferable. In addition to being less straightforward in attack-
ing the problem, it makes the recipient partner potentially liable on the
basis of subsequent business reversals even though the return of his or her
contribution, at the time it was accomplished, in no way threatened the
security of partnership creditors. On the other hand, the first method
would protect creditors when protection is warranted 240 and at the same
time would allow a partner to sever cleanly his or her relationship with the
business when protection is not warranted.
Finally, one may question why existing, but not interim, creditors are
protected in the rightful return situation. The only plausible explanation,
other than a simple desire to limit the partner's exposure to as narrow a
class as possible, is a recognition by the drafters that creditors, in fact, do
not base their credit decisions on information contained in the certificate
of limited partnership.241 This, of course, has serious implications regard-
ing the validity of the choices made with respect to wrongful returns and
compromises.
V. CONCLUSION
Commercially, the limited partnership has come of age. Recognizing
this, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated the 1976 Act to modernize the law, to clarify ambiguities and
fill interstices by adding more detailed language and mechanics, and to
make some important substantive changes and additions.2 42 With respect
to those provisions affecting the financial affairs of limited partnerships, it
must be concluded that the drafters met with only partial success in their
pursuit of these goals.
Chief among the drafters' substantive successes are the expansion of
permissible forms of capital contributions, provision of a framework
necessary to discharge its liabilities to all creditors who extended credit
or whose claims arose before such return, unless at the time of the return
he received all of the capital of his contribution and:
(a) The assets of the partnership exceeded its liabilities; and
(b) The partnership was able to meet its liabilities as they matured.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 88.180(4) (1979). The approach suggested in the text, in con-
trast to that of Nevada, would raise the standard for all distributions rather than
only for those that constitute the return of a contribution. In support of this
broadened scope, it is submitted that creditors are interested in assets distributed
by a limited partnership, not in how those assets may be classified for legal or ac-
counting purposes.
240. See B. MANNING, supra note 33, at 60.
241. The exclusion of existing tort claimants, however, may militate in favor
of the "narrowest possible class" theory.
242. 1976 ACT, supra note 9, Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
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governing withdrawal, inclusion of a method for determining when a part-
ner has received the return of his or her contribution, and addition of
default rules concerning allocation of profits, losses, and distributions.
Although the practical significance of the default rules is reduced by the
fact that these issues almost always will be covered by the partnership
agreement, they nevertheless fill a major gap in the 1916 Act in a way that
is appropriate to modem limited partnerships.
On the other hand, the 1976 Act continues certain provisions of the
1916 Act that seem questionable. Primary among these is section 801,
which permits any partner to veto continuation of the business on the
withdrawal of a general partner unless there are both a remaining general
partner and a right to continue granted by the certificate. Another signifi-
cant failure is the recodification, apparently without any consistent
underlying theme, of the rules regarding the liability of a partner who has
withdrawn his or her contribution. While the drafters were successful in
clarifying ambiguities and filling interstices in this area, a more general
rethinking of the substantive issues would have been desirable.
In expanding the authorized forms of capital contributions, the
drafters well may have created as many new interpretive problems as they
have attempted to solve in other areas. Their preoccupation with obliga-
tions to perform services in the future apparently has caused them to
neglect issues that may be raised by partners who default with respect to
other types of contributions. The question whether all or only certain
distribution rights must be contained in the certificate of limited partner-
ship also is one that could and should have been avoided with slightly more
care and coordination.
Thus, the results are mixed. While the 1976 Act must be regarded as
an improvement over the rather skeletal provisions of the 1916 Act, more
could have been done. Some substantive changes have been made, but
many of the policies embodied in the 1916 Act have been continued.
Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the basic policy choices
made, in light of the present economic importance of limited partner-
ships, greater foresight, clarity, and precision in drafting are required.
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